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Proposed regulations would restrict surface disposal of untreated 
produced waters by oil and gas producers in coastal south Louisiana. 
The regulations would impose costs on oil and gas activity. This 
dissertation develops an integrated model of exploration and production 
activities which utilizes both economic and geological concepts, in 
which the cost of compliance with the proposed regulations is treated 
as a reduction in the real net price of oil. The goal is to predict the 
effects of the porposed regulations on exploration and production 
activity in the study region.
The main findings are: (i) the proposed regulations would
reinforce the trend of falling levels of exploration activity, (ii) the 
rate of oil production from existing fields would not be greatly 
affected, (iii) the minimum economic field size would increase somewhat, 
and (iv) the productive life of fields would be shortened by less than 




Any attempt to curtail domestic petroleum industry activity in 
the face of mounting awareness of enviromental costs is viewed by many 
as injurious to the national interest because of the effects on 
economic growth and U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The acrimony over 
the issue of drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and 
off the coasts of both California and Florida (see Powell, 1991) 
illustrates the point. In order to make good decisions about optimal 
petroleum activity and methods we must know the costs and benefits of 
the various options.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and implement an 
environmental regulatory impact model for oil and gas activity in 
coastal south Louisiana. Specifically, it will address proposed 
regulations which would end the unrestricted disposal of oil and gas 
produced waters into the surface waters of the state. These 
regulations would impose compliance costs on the petroleum industry. 
This dissertation will determine what impact these regulations will 
have on exploration and production activity in coastal south 
Louisiana. It will not attempt to quantify the benefits engendered by 
these proposed regulations.
According to the Louisiana Administrative Code (LAC) 33:IX.708.B 
(proposed), produced waters are defined as liquids and suspended 
particulate waste material generated by the processing of fluids 
brought to the surface in conjunction with recovery of oil or natural
gas from underground geologic formations or with underground storage 
of hydrocarbons. The regulations would forbid discharges of produced 
waters directly onto "any vegetated area, soil, or intermittently 
exposed sediment surface" as well as into freshwater swamp or marsh 
areas other than "major deltaic passes" of the Mississippi and 
Atchafalaya Rivers. Produced waters discharged into intermediate, 
brackish or saline water areas inland of the territorial seas would be 
halted no later than 1 January 1995 unless a compliance schedule has 
been submitted and approved. Similar regulations are already in place 
in north Louisiana and Texas.
In the Fiscal and Economic Impact Statement for Administrative 
Rules submitted by the Department of Environmental Quality's Office of 
Water Resources (undated copy), the effects of produced waters 
discharged into surface waters are outlined. These include 
"significant quantities of petroleum hydrocarbons" accumulated in 
sediments near the discharges and the formation of oily sheens on the 
surface water. "Formation aromatic hydrocarbons in produced water can 
be ingested by fish and shellfish resulting in objectionable odor and 
taste" (p. 3), and "produced water is toxic to aquatic life, and has 
been shown to cause chromosome damage in juvenile fish". Produced 
water has been shown to contain benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene and 
other "organic toxic pollutants" which are known to be human 
carcinogens. Finally, "produced water may contain up to 2,800 pCi/1 
226Ra, a radioactive isotope known to cause bone cancer" (p. 3). A 
survey by DEQ's Office of Water Resources found an "average of 176 
pCi/1 226Ra and 180 pCi/1 228Ra in 403 produced water samples", a level
which is "600% over the Nuclear Regulatory Commission limits of 30 
pCi/1 for unrestricted discharge of these isotops" (p. 3). The FEIS 
reports that it has been "repeatedly shown" that the discharge of 
produced waters results in the degradation of receiving waters to the 
extent that they fail to meet existing Louisiana water quality 
standards. This section of the FEIS concludes that "a human health 
risk may be introduced by consumption of organisms tainted through 
exposure to oil field waste discharges" (p. 4).
These produced waters are generated by the production of oil and 
gas (primarily oil). When the oil is brought to the surface, it is 
frequently in the form of an emulsion with water. The oil and water 
are separated, the oil is sent on to the refinery and the water is 
disposed. The proposed regulations allow for treatment of the 
produced water and discharge into surface waters or injection of the 
untreated produced waters into subsurface formations. According to 
the DEQ's Office of Water Resources the unanimous industry response 
has been that subsurface injection is the least costly method of 
compliance. This compliance method will be assumed throughout this 
dissertation.
The production of oil necessarily begins with a search for 
pockets of oil and/or gas. It is assumed that exploratory firms do 
not know a priori whether a pocket contains oil, natural gas, a 
combination of both in some ratio, or neither. The process begins 
with seismic or other surface activity in order to determine likely 
locations in which to drill exploratory wells. There are two types of 
exploratory wells distinguished by location; those drilled in areas
known to contain petroleum or very near to known fields (called infill 
drilling) and those drilled in relatively unexplored areas (called 
wildcats). Wildcat drilling will be addressed in this dissertation 
because this type of exploratory drilling discovers new fields, while 
infill drilling is usually undertaken to define the boundaries of 
known fields or to hasten production from known fields.
Once a new field has been found production may begin depending 
upon whether the producer expects the field to be profitable. Given 
development costs, some level of current oil prices, and expectations 
about future oil prices, there is a minimum field size which will be 
economic to develop. Fields that are at least this size will be 
developed; fields smaller than this will not be developed currently 
but may be developed in the future. As an active field is produced, 
production gradually falls until the field is no longer profitable and 
it is shut in (the producer halts production operations). The exact 
shut in point is dependent upon economic variables and the rate at 
which production declines.
The contribution of this dissertation is to develop a fully 
integrated exploration/production (E/P) model of oil and gas activity. 
This model is calibrated on coastal south Louisiana but could be 
applied to other regions (eg, the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental 
Shelf). This integrated model is then used to compare E/P activity 
levels with and without the produced waters regulations. The 
difference between activity levels with and without the regulations 
will reflect the impact of the regulations.
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The model incorporates the regulations by using an estimate of 
compliance costs on a barrel of oil equivalent basis. The estimated 
compliance cost will reduce the net wellhead price (assumed to be 
exogenous for coastal south Louisiana), and the activity levels at the 
two different net wellhead prices will be compared. Because of the 
generality of the approach, this model could be used to gauge the 
impact of other costly regulations or changes in the net wellhead 
price of oil due to exogenous shocks on coastal south Louisiana E/P 
activity. With minor modifications the model could also be used to 
assess the effects of different tax regimes on E/P activity in the 
study region.
The estimated compliance cost is based on work done by Farber 
and Dupont (1992). They examined estimates of compliance costs on a 
barrel of water basis from two sources and used the midpoint of those 
two estimates. The cost on a barrel of oil basis was derived by 
calculating the median produced water to oil ratio for the affected 
fields and using that figure to convert the cost estimate from a 
produced water basis to an oil basis.
V
Walk, Haydel (1989), in a study prepared for the Mid Continent 
Oil and Gas Association, estimated a $7.00 per barrel of water 
disposal cost. This was based on the assumptions that producers would 
inject produced water from their fields themselves, that new wells 
would be drilled specially for injection in most fields, and that one 
disposal well would be needed for every four producing wells (Walk, 
Haydel, p. 3-4). These are rather extreme assumptions. It appears 
that in north Louisiana and Texas most produced waters are handled by
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commercial disposal (injection) operations and that considerably more 
than four producing wells are handled by each disposal well (see Kerr 
and Associates, 1990). In addition, Walk, Haydel specified elaborate 
pre-injection filtering and treatment systems that are not typically 
used in the United States (Kerr and Associates, p.2).
Kerr and Associates (1990), in a study prepared for the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, contacted vendors and 
contractors in south Louisiana and obtained estimates for the various 
services and equipment necessary to comply with the regulations. They 
estimated that compliance would cost $1.66 per barrel of water 
disposed, consisting of $1.32 per barrel for transportation (assuming 
a 3 hour round trip by truck) and $0.34 per barrel for injection. The 
injection cost is an average for several commercial disposal 
facilities in Louisiana. It should be noted that there is evidence 
that commercial disposal can cost as little as $0.25 per barrel of 
water injected. On the other hand, Kerr and Associates' estimate of 
transportation costs may be optimistically low. For fields which are 
inaccessible except by boat, truck transportation of produced water is 
not an option. Transportation costs may be considerably higher than 
that estimated by Kerr and Associates.
The heterogeneity of oil fields makes generalizations about 
compliance costs suspect. For fields which have ready access to 
commercial disposal facilities the compliance costs may be quite low. 
Fields which generate a higher than average volume of produced water 
relative to oil will experience compliance costs which may be much 
higher than those used in this dissertation. Stripper wells (wells
which produce fewer than 10 barrels of oil per day) will probably fall 
into the latter category, making them particularly susceptible to the 
impacts of the proposed regulations. The results of this dissertation 
may not be applicable to specific fields because of the heterogeneity 




According to Devarajan and Fisher (1981, p. 65), "there are only 
a few fields in economics whose antecedents can be traced to a single, 
seminal article. One such field is natural resource economics; . . . 
its origin is widely recognized as Harold Hotelling's ’The Economics 
of Exhaustible Resources' Hotelling's 1931 article will be the 
starting point for this literature review because most of the 
theoretical literature on the topic follows from his work. In 
addition to theoretical articles, the econometric work on oil and gas 
will be reviewed. Engineering and geological models of oil and gas 
exploration and extraction will be reviewed, followed by a review of 
those models that combine geologic and economic approaches (the hybrid 
models).
2. Theoretical Articles
Hotelling's "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" (1931) is 
probably best-known for the 'r% Rule', which states that the price net 
of extraction costs of an exhaustible resource must rise at the rate 
of interest along an efficient extraction path. He also showed that 
this will hold in a competitive resource industry equilibrium under 
certain conditions. The by now familiar explanation is that if net 
price is rising at the rate of interest a producer will be indifferent 
between extracting the resource (and earning the interest r on the
8
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money proceeds) or leaving the resource in the ground and allowing the 
value of the resource in the ground (the net price) to rise at the 
rate of interest.
Richard Gordon (1967) developed a model of industry behavior 
that built on the work done by Hotelling. However, Gordon concluded 
that "with increasing costs to cumulative output, the r per cent 
profits growth rule no longer holds" (p. 283). Gordon also asserted 
that no form of resource extracting industry will ever completely 
exhaust a mineral since higher expected future prices will always 
cause profit maximizing firms to shift production to the future (and 
reduce current output) in his model.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) presented a much richer model in which 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and the (exhaustible) 
resource is explicitly taken into account. They also introduced 
technical change into their model, thus allowing the possibility that 
at some future time the resource will no longer be required in order 
for production to take place. While this model is not precisely a 
model of firm or industry behavior it does lead to some conclusions 
about optimal extraction and price paths. Dasgupta and Heal concluded 
that "the conditions under which it is optimal to exhaust the 
resource in finite time are really rather stringent" (p. 26). They 
found further that for "moderate" values of their variables, "the 
price of the exhaustible resource relative to output ought to be 
rising rather rapidly" (p. 26), something which they pointed out does 
not seem to be the case.
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Kuller and Cummings (1974) derived an analytical management 
model of the petroleum reservoir that explicitly included some aspects 
of reservoir mechanics and engineering. Their most important 
contribution was the recognition in a theoretical model that the level 
of recoverable stock is to some extent dependent upon the time path of 
production. Kuller and Cummings found that the optimal rate of 
production is that rate at which the "marginal net income to firm j 
equals the user cost associated with firm j's production" (p. 73).
The user cost includes not only the impact of the current production 
on firm j's internal future costs but also "all external effects" 
including "effects on the aggregate recoverable stock" (p. 73). This 
is obviously not the same as the Hotelling Rule, but Kuller and 
Cummings developed a model of reservoir management, the goal being to 
"characterize optimal paths for production and investment for the 
reservoir during all periods" (p. 71).
The studies mentioned above implicitly assume that the reserve 
base is fixed, although some studies allow uncertainty about the size 
of the reserve base. Pindyck (1978) modeled both exploration and 
production simultaneously and introduced the idea that the reserve 
base is not fixed but can be changed by exploration for and discovery 
of new sources of the resource in question. This paper also 
introduced the concept that resources such as oil and gas are best 
thought of as nonrenewable rather than as exhaustible because economic 
incentives can cause reserves to be maintained or even expanded 
through further exploration. Pindyck fails to point out that this is 
only a short run phenomenom since exploration does not create reserves
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but merely moves the reserves (which must be finite) from the category 
of unknown to known. On a human time scale the sum of unknown plus 
known reserves is fixed and immutable. Because Pindyck modeled 
nonrenewable resource extraction as being heavily dependent upon 
exploration activity, and further that extraction costs are partially 
determined by the level of (known) reserves, he postulated several 
price profiles that are determined by the initial level of reserves.
If reserves are initially large enough, price will rise steadily as 
production proceeds. In this scenario, exploration is put off until 
near the end of the time horizon, depending upon extraction costs.
The more interesting price profile is one in which reserves start off 
very small. In this case, price begins at a very high level but 
declines steadily while exploration builds up the reserves. As 
exploration and reserves then decline, price begins to rise, giving 
overall a U-shaped price path.
In the Appendix to this model, Pindyck included a simulation 
model using aggregate data for the Permian Basin region of Texas. 
Pindyck simulated the model "repeatedly" while "varying the initial 
conditions until the terminal condition . . .  is satisfied" (p. 857). 
The terminal condition is that production, exploration and average 
profit all become zero simultaneously at the cutoff (backstop) price 
of $33 per barrel.
Hartwick (1991) showed that by reformulating Pindyck's (1978) 
model the r% Rule holds under certain condition for resource 
exploration and extraction firms. Thus firms that explore and extract 
simultaneously may still behave as Hotelling predicted. Hartwick
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claimed that "buried within the technically complicated model of the 
resource exploring-extracting firm of Pindyck (1978) is the classic r% 
rule of Gray and Hotelling" (p. 141).
An adaptation of Pindyck's (1978) model that is pertinent to 
this study is that of Yucel (1986). In Yucel's optimal control model, 
price is exogenously determined and extraction costs depend upon both 
current and cumulative production (p. 202). Both production and 
exploration functions are Cobb-Douglas, and Yucel explicitly mentioned 
process models in describing her exploration function. However, the 
most important aspect of Yucel's paper for this study is that she 
investigated the impact of ad valorem severance taxes on exploration 
and production. Her simulation study, the functions and parameters of 
which "were chosen to ’mimic' the Pindyck functions" (p. 217),
"confirms the static results that severance taxes in a competitive 
market reduce production and exploration for exhaustible resources"
(p. 216). The tax does not mean that the resource is conserved; new 
reserves are developed more slowly but known rserves are depleted more 
quickly. On the other hand, Yucel found that "generally, the 
deadweight losses are quite low" (p. 210). She attributed this to the 
fact that the impact of severance taxes on prices is cushioned because 
the tax burden is to a certain extent absorbed by producers in the 
form of lower rents. One caveat is that this holds only for fairly 
low severance tax rates (20% or less (p. 210)) since the tax becomes 
more distortionary as the tax rate increases.
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3. Econometric Studies
Econometric models of oil and gas exploration and production 
began to appear regularly in the early 1970's as a response to the 
perceived shortage of natural gas. Although these models were geared 
toward explaining natural gas supply, many either included 
considerations of oil supply or were easily modified to include oil.
Erickson and Spann (1971) presented a model of natural gas 
supply that attempted to explain how natural gas exploration is 
carried out and how economic variables affect the success of such 
exploration. They modeled this process with three equations 
describing the number of wildcats drilled, the success ratio of those 
wildcats and the average size of new discoveries. They modeled all 
three as a function of price; in other words, as the price changes so 
does the average size of new discoveries and the success ratio of 
wildcat wells. They took no explicit account of the physical effects 
of continued exploration in a given region, reasoning that (in Texas, 
at least) the prorationing system in effect in the period under study 
created incentives for producers to find and develop smaller gas 
fields and ignore larger ones. In addition, as prices rose producers 
were willing to drill less likely prospects and therefore the success 
ratio of drilling fell. Thus everything can be explained by the 
wellhead price of oil and gas in this model. Oil exploration was 
included because the authors did not feel that there was any evidence 
to indicate that firms knew in advance whether a prospect would be 
categorized as an oil or gas field if successful. In fact, a major
14
point of the paper was to determine the cross price elasticities 
between oil and gas.
Khazzoom's (1971) approach was slightly different from that of 
Erickson and Spann. Khazzoom defined two broad categories of gas 
supply: new discoveries and extensions and revisions of existing 
reserves. He modeled each as functions of the ceiling price of gas, 
the price of oil, the price of natural gas liquids and the previous 
period's value of the dependent variable. Khazzoom acknowledged that 
new discoveries are determined by the number of wildcats, the success 
ratio of those wildcats and the average size of new discoveries but 
apparently reasoned that these factors are all functions of the prices 
mentioned above and so did not use these factors explicitly in his 
econometric work. After estimating his equations for new discoveries 
and extensions and revisions (he pointed out that "the quality of 
available data on extensions and revisions leaves much to be desired", 
(p. 59)), he performed a simulation of the industry in the future.
MacAvoy and Pindyck (1973) used an approach that is similar to 
those of Erickson and Spann and Khazzoom, but on a more comprehensive 
scale. MacAvoy and Pindyck modeled natural gas supply with three 
equations representing drilling, size of new discoveries, and 
extensions/revisions. They use time series data from all 18 FPC 
districts, giving them both cross sectional and time series data.
Again, price was implicitly a primary explanatory variable since they 
actually use a revenue variable. Drilling costs and a risk variable 
were also introduced. No physical variables were used in the supply 
equations. However, in their production equation the explanatory
15
variables were the log of wellhead price and the quantity of total 
reserves. Their major contribution was that they also estimated 
wholesale demand and mainline demand. In this way, they could 
estimate excess demand for natural gas under various price scenarios 
by comparing the production to the demand. Given their reserves 
supply model they could forecast future long run shortages or 
oversupply.
Dennis Epple (1985) developed a "model in which the supply of 
exhaustible resources is rigorously derived from a theoretical model 
of optimal resource depletion" (p. 143). Unfortunately, Epple treated 
development and production as exogenously "determined by mechanical 
rules" (p. 154); in fact, in his model "a constant fraction of 
remaining reserves is produced each period" (p. 150). This seems to 
be the only way that he could convert the dynamic optimization model 
into an econometric model. He explicitly accounted for uncertainty 
about future prices and costs and drove the model from an objective 
function presumed to be maximized by the individual producers. This 
was an advance over previous econometric models because he explicitly 
began with a dynamic optimization framework and then fit data to his 
model to make it empirically operational. This paper highlighted the 
difficulties of using a dynamic optimization model to do empirical 
work. The fact that development and production are determined 
exogenously makes the model useless for many applications.
McDonald (1991) attempted to estimate the discount rate for 
producers implied by Pindyck's stochastic dynamic optimization models 
of natural resource production (1980, 1981, 1982). This was an
16
attempt to empirically test a dynamic optimization model, perhaps with 
a view towards applying it to policy questions. Lack of the necessary 
data forced McDonald to specify cost and production functions outside 
of the theoretical model, and his results are highly sensitive to 
those specifications. Nonetheless, McDonald estimated a discount rate 
of 90.75% based on Pindyck's models (p. 164). When he used a 
deterministic version of the model, the estimated discount rate was 
68.66% (p. 167). These discount rates appear to be rather high. 
McDonald concluded that "data limitations place severe restrictions on 
our ability to test economic theory" (p. 167) and stated that his data 
limitations were "most severe when it comes to measured resource 
stocks and engineering cost data" (p. 167). He also wrote that his 
research "highlighted the dfficulty in bridging the gap between theory 
and empirical analysis" (p. 167).
Deacon (1993) simulated tax effects on the petroleum industry in 
the United States using a model that "adopts the general structure 
developed by Pindyck (1978) and Yucel (1986)" (p. 160). The model 
abstracted from all uncertainty. He found that the income tax "causes 
only minor deviations from the untaxed solution" (p. 172), while the 
severance tax "alters drilling and output to a much greater degree"
(p. 173). The "dominant effect of the [severance] tax is high-grading 
. . . resources that would otherwise be . . . produced are rendered 
sub-economic by the severance tax" (p. 173). However, Deacon's 
results are sensitive to his estimated cost function; "a data base 
that would support precise econometric estimation of the cost function 
that applies to this industry is not presently available" (p. 184).
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This article served to indicate that data restrictions on empirical 
work in this area are troublesome.
4. Process Approach Studies
The earliest process model, and perhaps the most consistently 
cited, is that of Arps and Roberts (1958). This model was only 
concerned with oil field discovery, not production. Arps and Roberts 
developed a statistical model that described the number of fields of 
various size classes that they expect will be found in a specific 
geological region. This was a purely mechanical model, involving 
economics only to the extent that they explicitly recognized that some 
fields are too small to profitably develop. These non-commercial 
fields will not appear in the data and therefore must be accounted for 
in other ways, since their absence from the data means that the sample 
characteristics will only reflect the population characteristics for 
size classes which are commercially viable. Arps and Roberts' model 
used a log normal distribution to estimate the remaining fields in the 
study region.
M. K. Hubbert (1967) developed a process model in the strictest 
sense. Hubbert used historical drilling and discovery data to plot 
the trend of increases in proved reserves per year and per foot of 
exploratory drilling, then assumed that those trends would continue. 
Depletion effects would cause the finding rate per year and per foot 
of exploratory drilling to decline (p. 2215 and p. 2222).
Additionally, Hubbert projected annual production by observing that 
"cumulative production since 1925 had lagged that of cumulative
18
discovery by the nearly constant interval of 10-12 years" (p. 2210).
In this way, Hubbert estimated both the remaining reserves in the 
United States and the future time path of discovery and production of 
those reserves. Hubbert ignored economic variables completely 
(although he stated that his model "is not based on assumptions of 
static technology" (p. 2225)) and in this way missed an important 
point. Proved reserves are defined as those reserves recoverable 
"under existing economic and operating conditions" (Cleveland and 
Kaufmann, 1991, p. 145). If economic conditions change, proved 
reserves will change even in the absence of further exploratory 
drilling. Hubbert ignored this. This is a serious shortcoming to his 
and other process models.
Eckbo, Jacoby and Smith (1978) explicitly developed a 
relationship between price and the minimum economic field size. This 
allowed them to estimate how various oil prices would affect reserves. 
Their discovery model, on the other hand, excluded price as an 
explanatory variable. The discovery model was a probabilistic one 
based on a lognormal field size distribution that was similar to the 
work of Arps and Roberts. Their "dry hole risk" was estimated based 
on recent drilling history and the level of exploratory drilling was 
based on announced plans by drilling firms. Based on their estimate 
of reserve additions and their calculated relationship between price 
and minimum economic field size, the authors were able to estimate 
future production for a given price of oil. Finally, they concluded 
that small changes in oil price will have almost no effect on overall
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reserves and production because the marginal fields are so small that 
they contain only a tiny fraction of total reserves.
Attanasi and Haynes (1983) essentially updated the work of Arps 
and Roberts. They used 20 size classes in order to get more detail 
out of the model, but still used a lognormal field size distribution. 
They did not attempt to model how many exploratory wells will be 
drilled in a given region, but calculated how many new fields (and of 
what size class) will be found given some arbitrary number of wildcat 
wells. They estimated production from known fields on the basis of 
historical production profiles of similar fields. A similar study 
with similar results was performed by Drew, Schuenmeyer and Bawiec 
(1982). A further study along these lines was carried out by Drew,
Attanasi and Schuenmeyer (1988).
5. Hybrid Studies
The first hybrid model was developed by Uhler (1976) to estimate 
a stochastic production function for the discovery of new petroleum 
reserves. His paper was a direct response to Erickson and Spann
(1971) and the shortcomings found in that work. Uhler pointed out
that Erickson and Spann ignored the effects of the accumulation of 
geological knowledge, the eventual exhaustion of undiscovered 
reserves, and the tendency for the largest fields to be found first.
He overcame these problems by developing a process model and then 
describing how it could be adapted to the econometric model of 
Erickson and Spann. Uhler's main concern in this article was 
estimating the marginal exploration cost function. He found that the
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marginal cost of finding new oil reserves (in Alberta, Canada) rose 
rapidly over time.
Camm, et al. (1982) developed a model of oil production that 
included elements of both econometric models and process models in 
order to quantify the effects of severance taxes on oil produced in 
California. They acknowledged that the price of oil determines 
whether or not a field will continue to operate; unprofitable fields 
will be shut in and profitable fields will continue to produce.
However, they contended that the rate of production out of active 
fields is determined in large part by geological and engineering 
considerations rather than by economic considerations. Therefore 
their production model was split into two parts: an economic test to 
determine whether or not a field should continue to produce and then a 
process model to estimate the rate of production and the rate of 
decline of the production rate over time. Deacon, et al. (1990) 
developed a model that was striking in its similarity to that of Camm, 
et al. Deacon, et al. concluded that severance taxes of up to 9% on 
the value of the oil produced will reduce total production over a 
thirty year period by 7.7%, or about 799 mmbbl. This implies that the 
supply of oil in California is inelastic.
Kaufmann (1991) was also primarily concerned with production 
rather than exploration. He estimated a "natural" decline rate of 
production based on work by Hubbert (1962) and then calculated what 
production from a field or region would have been had it followed that 
estimated decline rate. This production profile "represents changes 
in the physical resource base that are not captured fully by economic
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or political variables" (p. 113). Then he found the difference 
between the estimated production and actual production and called this 
the residual. He then used economic and political variables to 
explain changes in the residual. In this way, both geological and 
economic factors were included in his production model. Kaufmann 
concluded that "oil prices probably do not contain all the information 
that is needed to analyze oil production" and "that the U.S. has 
depleted reservoirs from which oil can be recovered with a profit at 
current prices . . . the econometric portion of the analysis indicates 
that large increases in real oil prices are needed to offset the 
decline in production that is associated with future movements in the 
production curve" (p. 126).
6 . Summary
To summarize, there exist pure geological models of petroleum 
resource exploration and production that exclude any economic 
variables. There also exist econometric models which do not account 
for geophysical factors affecting oil and gas resources. Neither of 
these types of models is entirely satisfactory because neither employs 
a full spectrum of explanatory variables. Price and cost play the 
dominant role in the exploration for and development of oil and gas 
fields, while geological and engineering factors appear to determine 
production rates. Both types of factors influence the decision to 
shut down a field.
Attempts to include both physical and economic factors have been 
made for the most part only in production models (eg., Camm, et al.,
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Deacon, et al., and Kaufmann). These models Indicated that physical 
factors dominate economic factors in explaining oil production.
Uhler's hybrid model of petroleum exploration attempted to include 
some geological factors in an econometric model, but did not use what 
is now the generally acceped premise that fields are distributed log- 
normally by size in geologically homogeneous regions. I could find no 
hybrid models that did include this stylized fact.
This literature review also indicates that attempting to 
operationalize a dynamic optimization model is extremely difficult, 
particularly in view of the data requirements. The results of studies 
which have been done in this manner are not very satisfactory.
This dissertation will concentrate on developing a model of 
petroleum exploration that explicitly recognizes the log-normal 
distribution of fields by size, the tendency for the largest fields to 
be found and developed first and the declining marginal returns to 
exploration. However, the model will also recognize the importance of 
economic variables in determining the pace of exploration. On the 
production side, economic variables will dominate the models of oil 
field development and shut down decisions, while geological variables 





The exploration model consists of two interrelated systems. The 
overall goal of the model is to explain and predict exploratory 
drilling and the number of fields which will be found by the predicted 
exploratory drilling program. This requires a model of how oil and 
gas fields are distributed in the south Louisiana region and a model 
to explain the number of exploratory wells drilled in the region.
Given profit maximizing behavior by firms engaged in exploratory 
drilling, the number of wells drilled will depend to some extent on 
the expected success of a drilling program. To predict the success of 
a drilling program, an estimate is needed of the number and size of 
remaining (undiscovered) fields in the region.
2. Explicit Cost Function Drilling Model
It is possible to estimate a model of exploratory drilling for 
south Louisiana which will allow a forecast not only of future 
exploratory drilling, but also of the success rate of the drilling and 
the expected sizes of the fields found. Actually, this model will 
attempt to explain wildcat drilling, a more narrowly defined activity 
than exploratory drilling. Wildcat drilling is undertaken 
specifically to find new fields and is usually carried out some 
distance from known fields. Exploratory drilling in general can
23
24
include drilling around a known field in order to determine the 
boundaries and size of the field. These two types of drilling and the 
associated risks are very different, and no doubt the economic factors 
which drive them are accordingly different. The following analysis is 
confined to wildcat drilling since the point is to estimate how the 
proposed regulations will affect the rate at which new fields are 
discovered.
Firms which are engaged in wildcat drilling wish to maximize the 
expected value of a drilling plan. MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975) have 
constructed an explicit function that begins with a series of models 
for the pricing of capital assets under uncertainty (see MacAvoy and 
Pindyck (1975), p. 67). They represent the risk inherent in any 
drilling program by the variance of the cash flow, so that the 
certainty equivalent present value of net cash flow to a firm is
3.1) V =  ( 1 / r )  ( i c - k a )
where it is the total end-of-period cash flow to the firm and JE-E(it) is 
the expected value of it, o is the variance of i, X is an index of risk 
aversion, and r is a long-term market interest rate.
MacAvoy and Pindyck use the following profit function:
3.2) n = E ( n )  = W - R - C e (W)
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where W is the number of wells, R is the mean dollar receipts per 
well, and Ce(W) is the expected cost of drilling W wells. They define 
the mean dollar receipts per well as
3.3) R =  ( S G. P e G + S 0 . P e 0 )
where SG and §0 are the mean sizes of discoveries of gas and oil per 
well, respectively, and PG and Pq are the expected prices of gas and 
oil. By substitution into Equation 3.2
3.4) JE’(fc) = (W ‘ S G. P Ge + W ‘ S 0 . P 0 e ) - C e (W)
They approximate the variance of the total end-of-period cash flow to 
the firm by
3.5) V a r  (ft) = ( W ‘ S GV- (PGe)2 + W ' S QV’ (P0e)2) = W - S v ' P e
where SG and SG are the variances of the mean sizes of discoveries of 
gas and oil per well, respectively.
To simplify matters and to make this series of equations 
compatible with the reserve estimation work (Section 4) oil and gas 
can be combined by converting the gas on a Btu basis to barrels of oil 
equivalent (BOE). Gas prices will be converted to dollars per BOE 
($/BOE) in a similar fashion, and the two prices will be averaged,
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weighted by production volume shares. Substituting these BOE 
variables into Equation 3.1
3 .6 ) V =  — ( W - S - P * - C e ( W  - X - W - S v ) r
and taking the derivative of this expression with respect to W and 
setting it equal to zero gives
3 ‘7) ! S = [S-Pe- ^ - X - S v] /r = 0 o W d W
as the optimality condition on wildcat well drilling.
All of this is conditional upon success in drilling. In order 
to introduce this concept, let § now represent the mean size of 
discovery per successful well and let q> represent a measure of 
expected success in wildcat drilling (for example, MacAvoy and Pindyck 
use last period's success ratio).
At this point it is necessary to present a more explicit cost 
function. Since MacAvoy and Pindyck found that more drilling 
increased the costs per well (MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975), p. 70), 
they used a quadratic expression of the following form to represent 
expected cost of drilling a well:
3.8) C ° ( W )  = W + W - A T C +  — W22
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where ATC is the historical average drilling cost per well. The 
marginal cost for a well is then
3 .9 ) ,.??*(»). = l + A T C + 2 W  
dW
Now substitute this expression into Equation 3.7 to obtain:
3.10) ~  = (<p - S - P a + [ - l - A T C - 2 W \ - W - k - S v ) /r = 0 oW
Solving this equation for W gives the following expression for the 
number of wildcat wells drilled
3.11) &T=[<p - S - P e - A T C - X - S v - l ] / 3 r
The variance expression, Sv, used by MacAvoy and Pindyck consists 
of the squared terms in the first expression in Equation 3.11, i.e., 
Sv-<p2SPe2 (MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975), p. 77). The index of risk 
aversion drops out upon aggregating over all firms in a region, and 
according to MacAvoy and Pindyck (p. 71), the interest rate r from 
Equation 3.2 drops out because the model in order to become 
operational has now been converted to a one period model. However, 
MacAvoy and Pindyck add the interest rate back to their equation to 
account for the multiperiod nature of the petroleum investment
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process. Their final expression, adjusted for converting gas to oil 
on a Btu basis, is:
3 .12) W t = c0 + Cx ( R E V ) + C2 (VAR)  + C3 (A T C ) + C4 (I N T )  +€
where
R E V  = ( S )  (<p) ( ( P . ^ P . z + P . j )  /3)
and
ra* = (5s) (<p2) ( (P.1+P.2+P.3)2/9)
INT is the AAA corporate bond interest rate, ATC is the average total 
cost of drilling a well, S is the expected size of discoveries, and 9 
is the expected success ratio for exploratory drilling. Note that the 
expected price is proxied by a three year running average of past oil 
and gas prices.
3. An Alternative Drilling Model
A similar approach to the problem can be made which does not 
make an explicit assumption about the form of the cost function. We 
start by examining the "drilling plan", an optimal control problem 
which establishes an optimal drilling path for the purposes of 
planning. The risk-neutral firm solves this control problem:
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T
3.13) P V = J n t  ( W e , w c ) • e ' T t d t  
o
where wt is the number of wells drilled in period t and Wt is the 
cumulative number of wells drilled after t periods. The discounted 
profits of a future year's drilling (ie, the discounted profits of 
drilling w wells in period t) is
3.14) it t  = - ± - { P r ( W t , w t ) - P t  ■ Q ( Wt , w c) - C t ( Wc , w t ) )
where Pr(*) is the probability of success (which is a function of both 
cumulative and current drilling activity); P is the expected price 
path for oil and gas over the course of production from successful 
wells drilled in period t1; Q is the expected size of oil and gas 
discoveries found from drilling undertaken in period t; and C is 
expected exploration, development, and production costs over the 
course of operations of successful wells drilled in year t.
The shortcoming of the "drilling plan" approach is that costs 
and prices are very uncertain, and a firm would not adhere to a long­
term plan under conditions different from those assumed when the plan 
was formulated. Thus it is appropriate to consider each period's 
drilling program separately. In this case, the firm would seek to
1 Exploratory firms' price expectations are modeled very simply
in this work. This may be a serious problem, as Margaret Walls and
others have pointed out (see Walls, 1992).
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maximize Equation 3.14 above, the profits stemming from exploration 
activity undertaken next period. This can be operationalized in the 
following manner:
3 .15) n t = — ±-{Pr(W) -P-Q(W) -w-C(w)} c 1+r
The derivative of this function with respect to w is:
3 .16) 4 ^  = — — {Pr-P'Q-C') 
aw 1+r
Setting this equal to zero and solving for w (and assuming that second 
order conditions are met) gives the optimal number of wells to be 
drilled in period t,
3 .17) W* = w{Pl,P,Q,C', r)
However, unless the specific form of the cost function is known (or 
unless we are willing to make a rather heroic assumption about the 
form of the cost function), we are limited to estimating a general 
form of Equation 3.17 that may be mis-specified.
4. Technique for Estimating Undiscovered Fields
In estimating the remaining undiscovered fields In a region, it 
is not enough to merely estimate total hydrocarbon reserves in the
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ground. In order for the model to become operational an estimate must 
be made of how the reserves are distributed by size.2 This makes a 
difference because the smaller a field the less profitable it is to 
develop and produce that field, ceteris paribus. Also, larger fields 
typically have a larger surface area which makes them relatively 
easier to find (see Arps and Roberts (1958), Drew, et al. (1982), and 
Attanasi and Haynes (1983)).
The process begins by dividing known fields into size classes 
based on the amount of physically recoverable hydrocarbons in the 
field at the time of discovery. Since this distribution is not 
readily available, it is necessary to estimate it. This is done by 
taking the latest year's production and multiplying it by 8.2 for oil 
and 8.8 for gas. This figure is then added to the cumulative 
production to reach the estimated field size.3
Following Arps and Roberts (1958), it is assumed that for any 
given size class in a geologically homogeneous region, the probability 
of discovery of a field in that class is directly proportional to the 
number of undiscovered fields remaining in that class in the region 
and to the ratio of the average surface area of fields in that class 
to the overall area of the region. This means that the largest fields 
tend to be found first (see Attanasi and Haynes (1983), p. 11). As
2 In this thesis, "size" means the amount of physically 
recoverable hydrocarbons in a field at the time of the discovery of 
the field.
3 This method was suggested to me by Dr. E. D. Attanasi, an 
economist with the United States Geological Survey, during a telephone 
conversation.
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drilling continues over time, smaller and smaller fields will be found 
as the number of undiscovered fields declines in each size class.
From Attanasi and Haynes (1983), the analytical form of the 
field estimating equation is:
3.18) F t (W) = F 1 ( oo) (l-exp(-(Ci ‘ A s - W ) / B ) )
where Fj (W) is the cumulative number of fields in size class i expected 
to be discovered after drilling W exploratory wells, F{ (<») is the 
ultimate number of fields in size class i (including both those fields 
discovered to date and estimated undiscovered fields), B is the area 
of the region (in this case south Louisiana, a geologically 
homogeneous region), A- is the average area of the fields in size class 
i , and C1- is the efficiency of discovery of fields in size class i 
Fj(<») and are parameters to be estimated.
There is one further factor which complicates this process. 
Generally, only those fields which are economically viable (those 
fields large enough to be profitably developed) are reported. Fields 
smaller than this may be found but not reported and thus are not (and 
cannot be) included in the data. Attanasi and Haynes (1983) refer to 
this as economic truncation. Economic truncation and the ensuing data 
problem will cause biased estimates of Fj (“) and Cj for those size 
classes in which the economic truncation occurs. Economic truncation
4 When drilling is undertaken randomly, C. - 1; if, for example, 
Ci - 2 , then exploratory drilling is twice as efficient as drilling 
which is randomly undertaken. Note that 3Fj(W)/3C^ > 0.
will occur in the size class which represents marginal fields. As 
real oil and gas prices increased in the 1970's and again in the early 
1980's, many of these marginal fields became economically viable and 
were developed. They appear in the data as being "found" at this time 
when in fact they may have been found earlier. A further statistical 
complication arises from the fact that price is not the only factor 
which influences economic truncation. Small fields located near 
pipelines and other infrastructure may be developed while fields of 
the same size in other areas may not be developed.
To solve this problem, the work of Drew, et al. (1982) is 
useful. Drew, et al., assume that fields are distributed lognormally 
by size. They determine the size class which exhibits economic 
truncation. Essentially, this is the largest size class for which 
discovery rates did not significantly decline over the period of oil 
and gas activity in the study region. Drew, et al. use as the 
estimate of F|(<») for that size class the estimated ultimate number of 
fields in the next larger size class (F-+1(«»)) multiplied by 1.65 
(Drew, et al. (1982), pp. 17-22). They use this factor based on the 
fact that in their study of the western Gulf of Mexico they found that 
for size classes which did not exhibit economic truncation, each size 
class had approximately 1.65 times as many fields as the next larger 
class. For size classes that do exhibit economic truncation, it is 
only necessary to estimate the efficiency of discovery (Cj) using 
Equation 3.18 after calculating Fj(») using an economic truncation 
factor. Obviously, the choice of a truncation factor will affect the
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results of this procedure and therefore the results of the forecasting 
procedure.
Attanasi and Haynes' discovery process model will be used in 
conjunction with the wildcat drilling model to produce forecasts in 
the following manner. First, using 1986 data, an average size of 
discovery and a success ratio will be calculated (based on new finds 
in 1986) by using the number and size of new discoveries and the 
number of wildcat wells drilled. These values will then be used in 
the wildcat drilling model as the expected size of new discoveries and 
the expected success ratio. Using these and an expected price and 
average cost, along with an interest rate, a forecast value for the 
number of wildcat wells drilled in a year will be obtained (using the 
estimated parameters on Equations 3.12 and 3.17). The estimated 
number of wildcat wells will be used in Equation 3.18 to calculate a 
new Fj(W), using the estimated values of Fj (») and . The process can 
be repeated indefinitely.
5. Data and Data Sources
The data used in the drilling equations (Equations 3.12 and
3.17) are summarized in Table 3.1. The data run from 1960 to 1986 
giving 26 observations.5 Annual data were used because the majority 
of the data were not available on a monthly or quarterly basis.
5 While some of the data were available for years following 1986, 
it was not in the same form and not subject to the same filtering 
process as the other data. They were not used. The data prior to 
1960 were sketchy, incomplete and unreliable.
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TABLE 3.1
DRILLING MODELS DATA SUMMARY
VARIABLE MEAN DESCRIPTION
WELLS 156.55 # of wildcat wells drilled 
annually, 1960 - 1986
PRICE $13.04 3 year running average of 
weighted average price of oil 
and gas on BoE basis
SUCCESS 0.089 success ratio of wildcat 
drilling
SIZE 5742897 average size of new discoveries 
in BoE
REVENUE 4231591 product of size, success and 
price
VARIANCE 9.455 x 1012 same as REVENUE with terms 
squared before multiplying
AVGCOST $1458794 average cost to drill an 
exploratory well
INTEREST 3.6% AAA corporate bond interest 
rate
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The number of wildcat wells drilled each year in coastal south 
Louisiana was obtained from Louisiana Energy Statistics. 1909-1989.
(see Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 in that publication). These data also 
provided the success ratios for exploratory drilling as it was broken 
down into "Oil", "Gas" and "Dry". The simple ratio of "Oil" plus 
"Gas" to "Dry" was used as the success ratio. The success ratio for a 
given year was used as the expected probability of success for the 
next year.
The average size of newly discovered fields was determined by 
first listing all fields in the study region in order of discovery. 
Discovery dates were provided by the Louisiana Geological Survey 
(Lindstedt, et al., 1991) and checked with data from the Louisiana 
Office of Conservation. Then the initial size of the field was 
estimated using the procedure described above, and the average size of 
fields discovered in each year was then calculated. Again, the 
average size of new discoveries was used as the expected size of new 
discoveries in the following year. However, oil and gas were combined 
on a Btu basis by converting the gas from a cubic foot measure to a 
barrel of oil equivalent measure on the basis of the Btu content of a 
cubic foot of gas compared to a barrel of oil.6 This is a reasonable 
approach since oil and gas are joint products of exploratory drilling.
The average cost data were obtained from publications of the 
Hughes Tool Company located at the Center for Energy Studies. The 
data consisted of nominal dollar spending on exploratory drilling (not
6 The factor to convert 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas to a 
barrel of oil equivalent measure is 0.178. This factor can be found 
in almost any petroleum engineering textbook or handbook.
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only wildcat drilling but all exploratory drilling) in coastal south 
Louisiana on an annual basis. This value was divided by the number of 
all exploratory wells drilled in coastal south Louisiana to generate 
an average cost of drilling all exploratory wells. This is not 
precisely an average cost of drilling a wildcat well, but the 
differences are very likely small. While the factors driving wildcat 
drilling and the associated risks are not the same as those affecting 
other exploratory drilling activities, the actual process of drilling 
the wells is very similar. The actual costs of drilling are therefore 
assumed to be very similar.
The price data used are the price of oil and natural gas at the 
wellhead in south Louisiana, obtained from Louisiana Energy 
Statistics. 1909-1989. Table V.l. The price data were converted to an 
average price for oil and gas on a Btu basis (in the same manner that 
the volumes were converted), weighted by the shares of oil and gas 
discovered in each year. Expected price was proxied very simply by 
using a three years running average of the price per Btu. This simple 
price expectations process may be a serious problem and more research 
is needed in this area.
All of the price and cost data except for the interest rate 
variable were converted to real 1987 dollars using the GNP price 
deflator. The interest rate variable is the AAA corporate bond 
interest rate according to Citibase. The GNP deflator was also 
obtained from Cit?.base.
The data used in the discovery process model were collected from 
many of the same sources. First, the known fields were divided into
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classes based on the amount of physically recoverable hydrocarbons 
initially in place. See Table 3.2 for the upper and lower limits of 
the size classes; these classes are based on those used by Attanasi 
and Haynes. The cumulative and annual production were obtained from 
the 1987 edition of the Annual Oil and Gas Report. The initial 
production dates were obtained from Lindstedt, et al,, 1991. These 
initial production dates are the best available proxy for the finding 
date. In each size class, the fields were ordered by date of first 
production. The cumulative number of wells drilled up to the time of 
"discovery" was paired with each field. These two data points are 
Fj(W) and W, respectively (see Equation 3.18).
The basin size (ie, the size of coastal south Louisiana in 
acres) was obtained from the Louisiana Almanac by adding together the 
areas of each parish in the region. The average size of the fields in 
each class was obtained from the Louisiana Geological Survey, and then 
fitted using a quadratic expression. This was done because of 
problems with the raw data (the raw data were based on the number of 
wells in the field and the spacing between wells required by state 
law). See Table 3.2 for the size classes used, the known number of 
fields in each class, and the average acreage (A^) for each size class. 
The number of observations for each size class when estimating 
Equation 3.18 differed, not only because of the different number of 
known fields but also because before 1946 the records were rather 
sketchy. There are periods of several years when no fields are 
reported in the data as beginning production, but then a large number 
of fields are reported as being found (or starting production, to be
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TABLE 3.2










UPPER LIMIT OF 
CLASS (IN MILLIONS 
OF BoE)
LOWER LIMIT OF 
CLASS (IN 
MILLIONS OF BoE)
1 17 7883 1137 337
2 24 6061 280 170
3 25 4041 161 85
4 48 2596 84 42
5 54 1748 41 21
6 41 1310 20 10.5
7 50 1096 10.4 5.0
8 32 979 4.8 2.5
9 33 923 2.2 1.2
10 19 900 1.2 0.66
11 15 887 0.58 0.34
12 15 880 0.30 0.17
13 11 877 0.16 0.09
14 9 875 0.07 0.04
15 8 874 0.04 0.02
16 5 874 0.019 0.010
17 5 873 0.007 0.004
18 4 873 0.004 0.0019
19 6 873 0.0019 NA
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more precise) in the next year. The war years 1940 to 1946 are 
particularly problematic.
6 . Empirical Results
While Equation 3.12 can be estimated as it is shown, Equation 
3.17 cannot be estimated without ascribing some form to the equation. 
Without knowing the precise form of the variable functions, 
particularly the cost function, it is only possible to estimate a 
general form of Equation 3.17. In this case, a linear equation is 
estimated using a second-order autocorrelation model. The 
coefficients on the lag parameters are significant. The complete 
results are presented in Table 3.3.7
An interesting result of these regressions is that the 
coefficient on AVGCOST is positive. This is an unexpected result, as 
it implies that rising costs have a positive influence on drilling 
activity. One possible explanation is that the average cost data are 
capturing the utilization rate of drilling equipment; as drilling 
levels increase the price of the necessary equipment is bid up, 
leading to higher costs (i.e., an increasing cost industry). This 
parameter estimate is insignificant in the regression based on 
Equation 3.17.
The parameter on the price variable In Table 3.3 is 3.357. The 
standard error of the estimate is 1.306. Using the mean value of the
7 The regression model based on Equation 3.17 was also run in log 
form. However, the results were inferior in terms of the t-statistics 
and the Schwartz and Akaike information criterion. The log form 
resulted in a weaker estimated relationship between price and wildcat 
drilling but was generally similar to the results for Equation 3.17.
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TABLE 3.3
DRILLING MODELS REGRESSION RESULTS


























REG R2 0.6 0.6






* Significant at 0.01 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at 0.10 level.
1 Schwartz Information Criterion.
2 Akaike Information Criterion.
3 Durbin-Watson statistic before data transformation.
wildcat well variable (156.55) and the mean of the price variable 
(13.04), the price elasticity of wildcat drilling is calculated to be 
0.279. In other words, a 1% change in the price of oil and gas is 
estimated to lead to a change in wildcat drilling activity of less 
than 0.3% (the relationship is positive). This is an average
elasticity for the full sample. This result is counter-intuitive; it
is generally thought that higher oil prices greatly stimulate drilling 
activity. If the parameter was higher by an amount equal to the 
standard error (i.e., equal to 4.663) the elasticity estimated in the 
same manner would be 0.338.
One possible explanation for this result is the presence of 
multicollinearity. A collinearity diagnostic performed on this data 
shows that price and interest rate are linearly related (the
correlation coefficient is 0.85). Average cost may be related to both
the price and interest rate (correlation coefficients of (0.77 and 
0.76, respectively). The presence of multicollinearity may prevent 
the econometric model from detecting the full impact of price on 
wildcat drilling. However, the parameter estimates are stable around 
the reported values when variables are removed from the regression.
It has been suggested that because of a changing regulatory 
environment, drilling firms may have changed the way in which they 
formed expectations about future prices. During the early part of 
this period prices were quite stable; after 1972, prices were less 
stable and regulated in a way that kept them under the world price. 
Since complete deregulation in 1982, prices have been very volatile.
To determine the role played by these differing environments in the
A3
relationship between price and wildcat drilling, a three regime model 
was estimated. The resulting coefficients on the two early regime 
(i.e., from the first period to 1972 and from 1973 to 1982) price 
parameters were negative. The third regime coefficient was positive 
but smaller than the estimated coefficient for the overall model.
Under the assumption that during the earliest regime, when prices were 
most stable, the price variable used in this model most nearly 
represented drillers' expectations, this result is unexpected. The 
very stability of the prices means that there is almost no variability 
in the data and this fact may cause problems for the estimating 
program in the earliest regime.
The results of the discovery process model are presented in 
Table 3.A. The full work was done only for size classes 1 through 8, 
the largest size classes. The other classes were handled by 
calculating (») using an economic truncation factor, and then 
calculating Cj using Equation 3.18 by plugging in the calculated values 
of Fj(a®). This was done because an examination of the raw data 
indicates that economic truncation sets in with size class 8. Table 
3.2 shows that the number of known fields in each class declines 
steadily after size class 7, while we expect that the distribution of 
fields by size class is lognormal (see Attanasi and Drew, 1985).
Based on the relationship between size classes 1 through 8, an 
economic truncation factor of 1.2 was used to estimate F-(») for 
classes 9 through 19. The value of C{ for classes 9 through 19 is 
1.00. This is in part the result of the economic truncation that is 
taking place; it is possible that the efficiency of discovery is
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TABLE 3.4
DISCOVERY PROCESS MODEL REGRESSION RESULTS
CLASS KNOWN FLDS Fj (“) C«
1 17 17 4.48
2 24 24 3.96
3 25 25 3.48
4 48 48 4.01
5 54 54 3.24
6 41 47.8 1.48
7 50 57.7 1.98
8 32 49.6 1.17
9 33 55 1.00
10 19 66 1.00
11 15 79 1.00
12 15 95 1.00
13 11 114 1.00
14 9 137 1.00
15 8 164 1.00
16 5 197 1.00
17 5 236 1.00
18 4 284 1.00
19 6 341 1.00
For size classes 9 through 19, the ultimate number of fields 
(Fjf00)) is estimated using the economic truncation factor (1.2). See 
text for details.
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greater than 1.00 for some or all of these size classes. However, I 
see no way to accurately estimate C. for these classes given the 
limitations of the data. This problem will adversely affect the 
forecasts of drilling activity by understating the rate at which new 
fields are discovered.8
Given the results of the drilling models and the discovery 
process model, it is possible to make forecasts of drilling activity 
in coastal south Louisiana. This is done by using the 1986 success 
ratio and average size of new discoveries as the expected values of 
those variables for 1987. Using these values and a value for the 
expected price along with the parameter estimates from the two 
drilling models results in a forecast of the number of wildcat wells 
drilled in 1987.9 By using this forecast in Equation 3.18, an 
estimate can be made of the average size of new discoveries and the 
success ratio. This allows a forecast for 1988 in the same fashion 
that the 1987 forecast is made. This recursive process is repeatable.
Since the number of wildcat wells drilled is known for the years 
1987 through 1990, the forecasting was broken into two stages. First, 
forecasts were made for 1987 through 1990 using three different price 
paths (and average costs for the model based on Equation 3.12) so that
8 Other economic truncation factors were also used. The 
relationship between the first 8 classes was fitted using a quadratic 
function, and this was applied to classes 9 through 19. A factor of 
1.65 was used based on the work of Drew, et al. These two factors 
gave very unrealistic results. For instance, using a factor of 1.65 
indicates that there may be as many as 10,000 undiscovered fields in 
coastal south Louisiana.
9 The average cost variable was dropped from the forecasting using 
Equation 3.17 since it was insignificant in that model. It was 
retained for forecasting using Equation 3.12.
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a comparison could be made between the forecasts and the actual 
activity. Then a forecast was made for 1991 through 2001 using the 
price path that gave the best results in the first stage.
One other adjustment was made. In 1986, oil prices dropped 
precipitously and became more volatile. This indicates that a change 
in the structural equations also occurred. This fact is recognized by 
calibrating the model to 1987, by calculating a new intercept 
parameter that forces the model to accurately forecast the level of 
wildcat drilling in 1987. This procedure was carried out for both 
wildcat drilling models.
Table 3.5 shows calibrated and uncalibrated forecasting results 
based on Equation 3.17 for 1987 through 1990. Three different price 
paths were used: the actual price for each year, the real price in 
1986 (used for each year), and the real price in 1986 increased 2% 
each year. The calibrated model using the actual price matches most 
closely with the actual numbers of wildcat wells drilled during the 
period.
In Table 3.6, the results of the same procedures carried out 
using Equation 3.12 are presented. In this case, the different price 
paths also correspond to different average cost figures. The actual 
average cost, the real 1986 average cost (used for each year of the 
forecast), and the real 1986 average cost increased 2% each year were 
used. Again, the calibrated model using the actual price and average 
cost most accurately forecasted the level of wildcat drilling.
The second stage of forecasting using the calibrated model based 
on Equation 3.17 and the actual real price of oil and gas in 1990
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TABLE 3.5
DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990 
Uncalibrated Model
YEAR ACTUAL WELLS ACTUAL P CONSTANT P +2%/YR P
1986 149 149 149 149
1987 79 165 170 171
1988 66 159 163 165
1989 51 151 161 164
1990 46 158 163 167
DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990 
Model Calibrated to 1987
YEAR ACTUAL WELLS ACTUAL P CONSTANT P +2%/YR P
1986 149 149 149 149
1987 79 79 84 85
1988 66 72 77 79
1989 51 65 75 77
1990 46 73 77 82
NOTES: Actual P is the actual real price of oil and gas at the wellhead
in south Louisiana; Constant P is the real price of oil and gas at the 
wellhead in south Louisiana in 1986 (used for all five years of the 
forecast); +2%/yr P is the real price of oil and gas at the wellhead in 
south Louisiana in 1986 increased by 2% per year over the five years of 
the forecast. The actual AAA corporate bond interest rate was used in 




DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990 
MacAvoy and Plndyck Model, Uncalibrated
YEAR ACTUAL WELLS j ACTUAL P CONSTANT P +2%/YR P
1986 149 149 149 149
1987 79 149 160 161
1988 66 154 158 159
1989 51 155 157 158
1990 46 154 157 160
DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990 
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model, Calibrated to 1987
YEAR ACTUAL WELLS | ACTUAL P CONSTANT P +2%/YR P
1986 149 149 149 149
1987 79 79 90 91
1988 66 84 88 89
1989 51 84 86 87
1990 46 84 87 90
NOTES: Actual P is the actual real price of oil and gas at the wellhead
in south Louisiana for each year of the forecast; Constant P is the real 
1986 price of oil and gas at the wellhead in south Louisiana (used for 
each year of the forecast); +2%/yr P is the real 1986 price of oil and 
gas at the wellhead in south Louisiana increased 2% each year of the 
forecast. The actual AAA corporate bond interest rate was used in each 
case. See text for details.
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resulted in the forecasts shown in Table 3.7. The results show that 
the number of wildcat wells, the number of new fields expected to be 
found, the size of those fields and the success ratio of wildcat 
drilling all decline more or less smoothly. This is consistent with 
the underlying theory, since we expect the largest fields to be found 
first and smaller fields to be found as drilling continues. In 
addition, it is expected that it will become more and more difficult 
to find new fields as more drilling takes place, since smaller fields 
are more difficult to find.
Table 3.8 shows the results of the same procedures carried out 
with the calibrated wildcat drilling model of Equation 3.12. Again, 
the actual real 1990 price and average cost are used. The forecasts 
are broadly similar to those presented in Table 3.7, although the 
Equation 3.12 model consistently predicts higher levels of wildcat 
drilling.
The final step is to determine how the proposed regulations will 
affect wildcat drilling. This requires an estimate of compliance 
costs on a barrel of oil equivalent basis. Several estimates of total 
cost of compliance exist, but it is necessary to convert them from a 
cost per unit of water produced to a cost per barrel of oil produced. 
This is difficult because for any given field the ratio of produced 
waters to oil and gas changes over the life of the field. It is 
different for every field and is not known prior to the start of 
production operations.
Farber and Dupont (1992) have calculated an average compliance 
cost on a barrel of oil equivalent (BoE) basis. They examined the
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TABLE 3.7
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING, 1991 - 2001
Model Calibrated to 1987
YEAR WELLS NEW FIELDS SUCCESS SIZE
1991 67 5 0.084 251460
1992 67 6 0.084 251360
1993 66 5 0.083 251261
1994 67 6 0.082 251162
1995 66 5 0.082 251065
1996 66 5 0.081 250968
1997 66 6 0.080 250872
1998 66 5 0.079 250777
1999 65 5 0.079 250683
2000 65 5 0.078 250589
2001 66 5 0.077 250496
NOTES: New Fields is the number of new fields predicted to be found of 
all size classes, rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the 
success ratio (number of new fields before rounding divided by the 
number of wells predicted to be drilled); Size is the average size of 
the predicted new discoveries in barrels of oil equivalent; Wells is the 
predicted number of wildcat exploratory wells drilled in each year. The 
actual real 1990 price ($12.56/BoE) and the actual 1990 AAA corporate 
bond interest rate were used for each year.
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TABLE 3.8
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING, 1991 - 2001
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model, Calibrated to 1987
YEAR WELLS NEW FIELDS SUCCESS SIZE
1991 85 7 0.084 251396
1992 84 7 0.083 251271
1993 84 7 0.082 251147
1994 85 7 0.081 251023
1995 84 7 0.080 250900
1996 84 6 0.080 250779
1997 85 7 0.079 250658
1998 84 6 0.078 250537
1999 84 7 0.077 250418
2000 84 6 0.076 250300
2001 84 6 0.075 250182
NOTES: New Fields is the number of new fields predicted to be found of 
all size classes, rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the 
success ratio (number of new fields before rounding divided by the 
number of wells predicted to be drilled); Size is the average size of 
the predicted new discoveries in barrels of oil equivalent; Wells is the 
predicted number of wildcat exploratory wells drilled in each year. The 
actual real 1990 price ($12.56/BoE) and Avgcost ($1229786) were used, 
as well as the 1990 AAA corporate bond interest rate, for each year.
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ratio of produced waters to produced hydrocarbons for fields in south 
Louisiana and then chose the median value of these ratios. They used 
this median value to convert two compliance cost estimates to a cost 
per barrel of oil basis. The two compliance cost estimates were from 
a study by Walk, Haydel and Associates (1989) and Kerr and Associates. 
The Walk, Haydel study indicated a cost per BoE of $1.13, based on the 
assumptions that the regulations would require one injection well for 
every four active wells and that all injection wells would have to be 
drilled (as opposed to using existing but abandoned wells). The Kerr 
study indicated a cost of $0.27/BoE based on the cost of subsurface 
injection of produced waters at commercial injection facilities.
Neither of these estimates is without problems (see Chapter 1), but 
given that no other estimates are available Farber and Dupont used the 
average of these two estimates, $0.70 per barrel of oil equivalent, as 
their compliance cost. This estimate of the compliance cost is also 
used in this study.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to compare the impact of 
the various compliance cost estimates and different parameter 
estimates for the price variable. The results are presented in Table 
3.9. The columns represent the parameter estimates: in the center is 
the reported estimate (3.357), on the right is the parameter plus the 
standard error (4.663), while on the left is the parameter minus the 
standard error (2.051). The rows represent the different compliance 
cost estimates discussed previously, starting with the Walk, Haydel 
estimate at the top. The numbers inside the table are the changes in 




P - 2.051 P - 3.357 P - 4.663
COST EFFECT COST EFFECT COST EFFECT |
$1.13 -2.26 $1.13 -3.79 $1.13 - 5 ,  1
0.70 -1.4 0.70 -2.35 0.70 -3.22 1
0.27 -0.48 0.27 -0.8 0.27 -1.1 |
P is the parameter estimate on Price in the drilling model. Cost 
is the estimated compliance cost from the Walk, Haydel study, Farber and 
Dupont (1992), and the Kerr and Associates study, respectively. Effect 
is the decrease in wildcat drilling activity associated with the 
respective compliance cost estimate and price parameter. The actual 
estimate of the Price parameter is 3.357.
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numbers since these are all reductions over the number that would be 
drilled in the absence of the regulations.
Table 3.10 shows the forecasting results based on the real 1990 
price of oil and gas reduced by $0.70/BoE in order to examine the 
effects of the regulations. In every other respect, the forecasts in 
Table 3.10 are identical to the results in Table 3.7. By comparing 
the two, it can be seen that the regulations reduce the level of 
wildcat drilling, which slows the decline in the success ratio and 
average size of new discoveries. In other words, the drilling 
activity is delayed and future discoveries are therefore also delayed. 
Table 3.11 repeats the procedures outlined above for the drilling 
model based on Equation 3.12. By comparing this table with Table 3.8, 
one can see how this model predicts that the regulations will affect 
drilling in south Louisiana. The same broad conclusions apply, namely 
that the drilling activity and discovery is delayed.
7. Summary and Conclusions
Two different approaches to modelling oil and gas drilling 
activity in coastal south Louisiana have been utilized. Both of these 
models provide broadly similar results, and it appears that wildcat 
drilling is fairly insensitive to the price of oil and gas. The 
drilling models in combination with a discovery process model form an 
overall model that can be used to forecast future levels of wildcat 
drilling activity. These forecasts indicate that drilling activity 
will continue to decline even if real oil and gas prices are constant. 
This may result from the fact that the study area (coastal south
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TABLE 3.10
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING WITH REGULATIONS
Model Calibrated to 1987
YEAR WELLS NEW FIELDS SUCCESS SIZE
1991 65 5 0.085 251460
1992 64 6 0.084 251363
1993 64 5 0.083 251268
1994 64 5 0.082 251173
1995 64 5 0.082 251079
1996 64 5 0.081 250985
1997 64 5 0.080 250893
1998 63 5 0.080 250801
1999 63 5 0.079 250710
2000 63 5 0.078 250619
2001 63 5 0.078 250529
NOTES: New Fields is the predicted number of new fields to be found, 
rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the success ratio of 
drilling (the predicted number of new fields before rounding divided by 
the predicted number of exploratory wells); Size is the average size of 
predicted new fields; Wells is the predicted number of wildcat 
exploratory wells. The actual real 1990 price of oil and gas less 
compliance costs ($11.86/BoE) and the actual 1990 AAA corporate bond 
interest rate were used for each year.
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TABLE 3.11
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING WITH REGULATIONS
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model Calibrated to 1987
YEAR WELLS NEW FIELDS SUCCESS SIZE
1991 85 7 0.084 251396
1992 84 7 0.083 251271
1993 84 7 0.082 251147
1994 84 7 0.081 251023
1995 85 7 0.081 250901
1996 84 6 0.080 250779
1997 84 7 0.079 250658
1998 84 6 0.078 250538
1999 84 7 0.077 250419
2000 84 6 0.076 250301
2001 84 6 0.075 250183
NOTES: New Fields is the predicted number of new fields to be found, 
rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the success ratio of 
drilling (the predicted number of new fields before rounding divided by 
the predicted number of exploratory wells); Size is the average size of 
predicted new fields; Wells is the predicted number of wildcat 
exploratory wells. The actual real 1990 price of oil and gas less 
compliance costs ($11.86/BoE), the actual real 1990 Avgcost ($1229786) 
and the actual 1990 AAA corporate bond interest rate were used for each 
forecast year.
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Louisiana) has been thoroughly explored and it is assumed that only 
small fields remain to be found and developed.
The proposed regulations would impose costs on firms engaged in 
the petroleum industry, and these costs would reinforce these trends. 
The drilling will be spread farther into the future, as would the 





Regulatory changes, as well as tax and price changes, can affect 
the production of oil and gas in three ways: the rate at which oil and 
gas is produced may be altered, the productive life of a well or field 
may be changed, or in the case of newly discovered oil whether the 
field is developed. This chapter will address all three issues and 
attempt to develop models that explain producing firms' responses to 
costly new regulations.
2. Models of Production from Existing Fields
There are essentially two types of models that seek to describe 
the rate of production of hydrocarbons from a reservoir. First are 
the geophysical (engineering) models, pioneered by M. King Hubbert in 
1962. These models explain oil production solely on the basis of 
engineering concepts and ignore any economic or regulatory variables. 
Production is modelled as rising quickly to a peak level, followed by 
a long decline in production rates as the natural drive mechanism 
slowly loses its energy. These models focus on estimating the decline 
rate and estimate ultimate production from a field or well as a 
function of that decline rate.
In response to changes in the oil industry in the early 1970's, 
economists unleashed a flood of oil models (see, eg, MIT Energy 
Laboratory, 1974 and National Petroleum Council, 1971). These models
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stood on the premise (whether explicit or implicit) that oil prices 
reflect all relevant data. Kaufmann (1991) reports that these models 
performed very poorly and in general tended to overestimate the 
response of oil supply to changes in oil price. More recent 
econometric models of oil supply and production do not seem to have 
improved matters much (see Hall, et al., 1986).
Kaufmann (1991) attempts to combine the engineering and 
econometric models by arguing that geophysical factors impose severe 
constraints on a firm's ability to respond to economic variables. He 
calculates a "natural" decline rate using a model developed by Hubbert 
(1962), and then calculates what production would have been each year 
had production declined at that "natural" rate. Then he finds the 
difference between actual production and the calculated production, 
and proposes that this residual represents the response of oil 
production to changes in economic and political variables. It is the 
residual (not the actual production level) which is explained by 
prices and other variables.
Kaufmann uses Equation 4.1 to describe the "natural" decline 
rate (Kaufmann, 1991, p. 114):
4.1) In [ { Q j Q t ) -1] = In a  -  b ( C - t 0 )
where Q,, is the (separately estimated) ultimate production of oil, Qt 
is the cumulative production at time t, and tQ is the start date of 
production. Given an estimate of this equation, it is possible to 
backcast annual production at the "natural" decline rate noting that Qt
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is cumulative production. The difference between this estimated 
backcast production and the actual production is Rt, the residual at 
time t. Kaufmann models the residual as follows:
4.2) R t = a + P^Pod^,) + P 2 (P0<3.4.5)> + P 3 (Po/Pg) +P4(TR0 + P 5 ( A e t)
in which PQ(1 2) and Po(3 4 5) are the average real price of oil 1 and 2 
years ago and 3, 4, and 5 years ago respectively. P0/Pg is the ratio 
of the real price of oil and the real price of natural gas. Using 
Texas as the source of his observations, TRC represents the fraction 
of production capacity shut in by the Texas Railroad Commission. AQt 
is the first difference of the backcast production after the peak but 
zero before the peak. Kaufmann uses this variable to test the 
symmetry of the backcast production curve.
An alternative specification to Equation 4.2 is one that 
recognizes Hotelling's (1931) analysis of natural resource production. 
Hotelling argued that the expected change in price net of production 
costs (net price) and the expected interest rate would jointly 
influence the production of a natural resource such as oil. The 
Hotelling model tells us that the real (net) price of oil will rise at 
the rate of interest, assuming a perfectly competitive industry, no 
rule of capture, no uncertainty, and constant demand. If the 
percentage change in real net price of oil (%APQ) is greater than the 
real interest rate (I), a decrease in production is expected as firms 
leave the oil in the ground awaiting the higher future prices. If %AP0 
< I, firms will increase production, increasing current revenues
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(relative to future revenues at lower prices) and earning the 
relatively higher rate of interest. A Hotelling variable is created 
by taking the difference between the percentage change in the real 
price of oil and the real interest rate. It is possible to test 
Hotelling's theory. For this reason, the following alternative 
specification was tested:
4.3) Rt = f(%AP0-I) 
where Rt > 0 if (%AP0-J) < 0 
Rt < 0 if (%APe-J) > 0
Rt = 0 if (%APe-J) = 0
Hotelling's thesis can also be tested by using the actual production
rates and the same explanatory variable on the right hand side.
Finally, a piece-wise continuous form of Equation 4.3 can be 
tested wherein the dependent variable is the residual and the 
independent variable is the natural log of the absolute value of the 
Hotelling variable multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
Hotelling variable is positive and 0 otherwise plus the natural log of 
the absolute value of the Hotelling variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the Hotelling variable is negative and zero 
otherwise. The sign of the parameters is expected to be negative when 
the Hotelling variable is positive and positive when the Hotelling 
variable is negative. However, the response of producers may be 
asymmetric in that it is no doubt easier to lower production than to 
raise production. For that reason, it is expected that more 
parameters will be significant when the Hotelling variable is positive
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than when it is negative. Unfortunately, without knowing what 
producers' price expectations were at the time that these production 
decisions were being made, the percentage changes in actual historical 
prices were used in calculating the Hotelling variables.
The best test of Hotelling's theory would take into account 
producer price expectations. Therefore, a model was tested in which 
the Hotelling variable was constructed using future prices as if 
producers knew with perfect foresight what oil prices would be next 
period. The parameter estimates obtained were significant in some 
cases, primarily for the medium to large fields. This type of model 
is obviously not useful for forecasting purposes is mentioned here 
only to illustrate that expectations do play a role in producer firm 
decision making.
Hotelling's comparative statics indicate that an expected 
increase in the cost of production which will reduce net price will 
cause production to increase (since the higher production costs will 
cause %AP0 to fall below I). If the increase in production cost is 
expected to be temporary and the net price is expected to return to 
current real levels over time, the current net price will fall 
relative to future net price causing %AP0 > I and a decrease in current 
production. However, if the increase in production costs and the 
corresponding fall in net price is a one time discrete change, this 
will not affect the percentage change in net price and thus will not 
affect production rates at all.
One serious problem with Kaufmann's approach is the use of an 
estimated "natural" decline rate. The firm has some influence over
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the decline rate through decisions about initial capital investment in 
a field or well. A larger investment in the field will lead to a 
higher initial capacity and a higher decline rate (production will 
fall more quickly from one period to the next). Two factors will 
mitigate the tendency for the firm to produce the oil as quickly as 
possible. The marginal cost of initial capacity is increasing, but 
additionally (and more importantly) the more quickly a field or well 
is produced (ie, the higher the initial capacity) the less oil that is 
ultimately recovered. Thus the firm will choose the optimal initial 
capacity and simultaneously choose (within the geophysical limits 
defined by the reservoir and its drive mechanism) the decline rate. 
There may be no "natural" decline rate in the sense that Kaufmann 
apparently uses the word.
A different approach to synthesizing the engineering and 
econometric approaches is that of Camm, et al. (1982) and Deacon, et 
al. (1990). These studies examine the impact of new or higher state 
severance taxes on oil produced in California and are very relevant to 
this thesis. Camm, et al. argue that the decline rate is fixed by the 
initial capacity and that therefore production does not deviate 
significantly from the path dictated by the decline rate. Camm, et 
al. do not include production as a choice variable for firms in their 
model. They reason further that even in the face of rising real oil 
prices costs must rise faster than revenues, else no well or field 
would ever be shut down for economic reasons. Thus net revenues from 
a field or well decline at a constant rate in their model, and the 
effects of a change in the level of net price (resulting from the
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imposition of costly regulations, for instance) will affect production 
only in the choice of the period in which the well or field will be 
shut down. The change will not affect the rate of production in Camm, 
et al.'s model.10
If decline rates are fixed by the choice of initial capacity, as 
asserted by Camm, et al. and Deacon, et al., then changes in the net 
price of oil will only affect the minimum economic field size and the 
shut down point (discussed in the following Section) but not the rate 
at which oil is produced from existing fields. If, on the other hand, 
the extracting firm has control over the decline rate, then changes in 
the real net price of oil will affect production from current on-line 
wells. This question of whether or not decline rates of on-line wells 
(ie, production rates) respond to changes in economic variables is 
testable empirically.
In addition to Equation 4.2 and the two forms of Equation 4.3, 
two other specifications of firm production decisions can be tested. 
First, actual production could be specified as a function of the three 
price variables which appear in Equation 4.2. In addition, actual 
production could be specified as a function of the current real price 
of oil. These five specifications generally stem from the assumption 
that firms adjust their output (production) in response to price 
changes (or changes in net price) in order to maximize profits.
10 Note that the Hotelling model suggests that production is 
affected only by changes in net price, not the absolute price (except 
when the absolute price falls so low that the decision is made to shut 
in a well or when it rises so high that no sales are made). In this 
very narrow sense, the model of Camm, et al. follows the Hotelling 
model.
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3. Models of Field Development and Shut Down Decisions
There are several major approaches to determining the firm's 
shut down point and the related question of the minimum size of a 
field which may be profitably developed (the minimum economic field 
size). That these two issues are the same is clear when it is 
considered that for a field which is not sufficiently large to 
profitably develop, the shut down time is identical to the initial 
period. A well or field is shut down (or shut in) if production 
ceases. However, this is not the same as abandonment. Abandonment is 
a permanent destruction of a well, usually by plugging it with cement 
and removing all surface equipment. A firm can shut in a well for a 
period of time and then restart production at a later date, but this 
appears to be a relatively rare event. Clarke and Reed (1990) point 
out that the shut down decision is quite complex and the outcome is 
dependent on the firm's expectations of future prices. Clarke and 
Reed develop an elegant model of the shut down decision11, but are 
unable to carry out any empirical work because of the data 
requirements of their model.12
A simpler model of the shut down decision is developed by Camm, 
et al. (Deacon, et al. develop a similar model). It builds on the 
results of their production model in that it is assumed that the 
decline rate is partly determined by the initial investment in 
capacity but that it is not sensitive to price changes. Further, the
11 They actually develop a model of the abandonment decision, but 
the shut down decision is implicit in this.
12 For further evidence of the extreme difficulty of applying 
dynamic models of natural resource production, see McDonald, 1991.
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authors assume that there is some cost that is related to initial 
capacity but that is not related to production (ie, a fixed cost). 
Finally, they assume that production will continue so long as 
"revenues net of taxes can cover annual operating costs" (Camm, et 
al., p. 180).
In the face of some Irreducible level of uncertainty about 
future prices it is reasonable to model the firm as making the 
decision whether to continue production or to shut down as a discrete, 
periodic decision. Camm, et al. start by specifying current 
production (in period tc) as:
4.4) K ( t 0 ) e ' 6<t c ' to)
where K(tQ) is initial capacity, ft is the decline rate and tQ is the 
initial production date. Now, revenue net of production related costs 
and taxes is:
4.5) p - K ( t 0 ) e 'Mtc'£o)
where p is the price net of production related costs and taxes, and 
other variables are defined as before. Production continues until 
time tc when:
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4.6) (p-e"Mtc"to) - 2>0) t0) =0
where bQ are non-production related, but non-sunk, fixed costs measured 
in dollars per barrel of initial capacity and other variables are 
defined as before.
By examining Equation 4.6 it can be shown that the change in the 
productive life of a field is represented by the following 
relationship,
4.7) T'-T = -iinfwEo 5 p
where net price changes from p to p' and field life changes from T to 
T' (Camm, et al., p. 182). Equation 4.7 will lead to estimates of the 
change in productive life of any given field in the face of a change 
in the price of oil.
The assumption of price exogeneity allows a calculation of the 
profit maximizing firm's shut down point and thus leads to a 
calculation of lost production due to the regulations. The firm will 
continue to produce oil until the price of the oil is equal to the 
marginal cost of production. Since the production by an individual 
firm in coastal south Louisiana is assumed to have no effect on the 
price of oil we have only to estimte the marginal cost. This is done 
by calculating the direct operating costs for future years based on 
the estimated cost function (see Section 4.4). For each year, the 
operating cost is the increase in total cost of producing the field
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while the production is the increase in total output from the field.
The marginal cost for the year's production is derived by dividing 
these two.
Since the costs are steadily increasing and production is 
steadily decreasing, it is seen that the marginal cost is increasing 
from year to year. This is due primarily to the effect of depletion; 
each barrel of oil is more costly to extract than the previous one. 
However, readers should keep in mind that several assumptions are 
being made here. It is assumed that the marginal costs are constant 
for each year and only change from one year to the next rather than 
being a smoothly continuous function. This implies that the results 
of the procedure just outlined will only provide an upper bound on the 
lost production volume. For instance, if the calculated marginal cost 
is $18 in one year and $22 the next and the price is assumed to be $20 
per barrel (all in constant dollars), we can say that production will 
continue through the first year but will not take place in the second 
year. With the regulations in place at an estimated cost of $0.70 per 
barrel, the upper bound on the lost production is the production from 
the first year even though we still predict production to continue 
through the first year but not the second. The model cannot provide 
precise estimates of lost production. In addition, no enhanced oil 
recovery is allowed in the model.
To calculate the minimum economic field size and its sensitivity 
to changes in net price, it is recalled that firms wish to maximize 
the net present value (NPV) of production from a field. The NPV of 
production can be expressed in the following form:
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T T
4 .8) NPV = -SC + Po'K'f e~(r**~K) tdt - OC' j e~lr~c)tdt
0 0
where SC are sunk costs (drilling expenses and production equipment), 
PQ is the real 1987 price of oil, K is the initial production level, r 
is the interest rate, 8 is the decline rate, tc is the rate of real 
price increase, OC are annual real operating costs and c is the annual 
rate of increase of real operating costs. T is the expected life of 
the field. If the NPV is negative no production will take place. By 
setting NPV equal to zero and solving for K we get minimum economic 
field size.
4. Data and Data Sources
Data used in this chapter are summarized in Table 4.1. The data 
run from 1953 to 1987 giving 35 observations unless otherwise noted. 
Annual data were used because much of it is not available on any other 
basis.
Annual production from selected fields was obtained from the 
1953 through 1987 editions of Annual Oil and Gas Report. A 
description of how the ultimate production of oil for individual 
fields was estimated can be found in Chapter 3. The time variable 
used in Equation 4.1 is simply a column of index numbers.
The economic variables were obtained from Louisiana Energy 
Statistics. 1909-1989. These prices were adjusted for inflation using 
the GNP deflator (obtained from Citibase). The interest rate is the 
AAA corporate bond rate (also obtained from Citibase), which was also
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TABLE 4.1 
PRODUCTION MODELS DATA SUMMARY
VARIABLE MEAN DESCRIPTION
RESIDUAL Difference between production 
estimated using "natural" 
decline rate and actual 
production
PRODUCTION Annual production
TIME Years of production between 
1953 and 1987
PRICE, §2 $15.74 Two year running average of 
net real price of oil
p r i c e35 $14.53 Running average of net real 
oil price 3, 4, and 5 years 
previous
O/G PRICE 3.11 Ratio of real oil to real 
natural gas price
HOTEL Hotelling variable; equal to 
percent change in net price 
less the real interest rate
PRICE $16.03 net real price of oil; south 
Louisiana onshore, at wellhead
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adjusted to real values. In every case, the prices used are the 
wellhead price in south Louisiana.
Production cost data are only available from 1976 (see Deacon, 
1993). The available data were obtained directly from Mr. Ralph 
Russell of the Dallas field office of the Department of Energy's 
Energy Information Administration. A cost series from 1953 to 1987 
was constructed by regressing the natural logarithm of the available 
cost data against an index. The available cost data are in the form 
of four series (one for each of four depths) of average annual direct 
operating costs for a coastal south Louisiana oil field with 10 
producing wells. This was converted to a cost per barrel of oil basis 
by dividing the annual cost by the annual oil production from the 
fields used in the study. This resulted in an average production cost 
of $0.50/bbl, with a high of $9.76/bbl and a low of $0.12/bbl (all 
using 1987 cost and production data). The high value resulted from a 
field which had very little production in 1987.
Only recently has the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
begun to keep statistics on the number of wells active in fields, so 
it was not possible to adjust this cost series to reflect different 
numbers of operating wells in the fields in the study. However, 
average production depths for the fields in the study were obtained 
from the Production Audit Reporting System (PARS) and the appropriate 
cost series was used based on the average producing depth for each 
field.
Field level data were used rather than less aggregrated data 
because of problems encountered obtaining and utilizing lease level
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production reports. The lease level data are not as complete as the 
field level data, particularly for periods preceding 1978. In 
general, relationships not observed at the field level are not 
expected to be observable at a more disaggregated level.
Sunk costs of production were obtained from the DOE-EIA 
publication Costs and Indices for Domestic Oil and Gas Field Equipment 
and Production Operations. 1987 through 1989.
5. Empirical Results
Equation 4.1 was estimated for thirteen fields in south 
Louisiana, selected from various areas and the seven largest class 
sizes (see Chapter 3). Fields from smaller class sizes were not 
selected because, for many of them, their productive lives were so 
short that considerably fewer than 35 years of data exist. As it is, 
several of the fields actually used in the estimate ceased production 
before 1987. The results of these thirteen regressions are presented 
in Table 4.2. The regressions were run using a two period 
autoregressive model.
Note that in every case the intercept parameter and the 
parameter on the TIME variable (ie, the decline rate) are significant 
at the 0.01 level. These results should be viewed with some caution 
since the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the hypothesis that 
autocorrelation is present cannot be rejected despite the use of a 
second order autoregressive model.
In order to obtain net prices, it is necessary to obtain a real 
operating cost series. This was done using a log-linear equation as
TABLE 4.2
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RESULTS OF EQUATION 4.1 FOR SELECTED FIELDS











































































* Denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic after data transformation.
REG R2 is the R2 for the structural part of the model (ie, excluding 
the autoregressive parameters).
TOTAL R2 is the R2 for the total model, including the autoregressive 
parameters.
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described in Section 4.4. These regressions were also run using a two 
period autoregressive model. The results are shown in Table 4.3.
Note that the intercepts are significant at the 0.01 level in all four 
series, while the parameters on the index are in no case significant. 
These parameters were used to create four series of costs from 1953 
through 1987. The absence of significance on the index parameters 
suggests that the reliability of the constructed cost series is low. 
This may affect the estimates of models that use this series.
The estimated decline rates (Table 4.2) were used to backcast 
production (as described in Section 4.2). The difference between 
actual and backcast production (the residual, Rt) was used as the 
dependent variable for two different regressions for each of the 
thirteen fields. The explanatory variables used are given in the 
text, except that neither the TRC variable nor the first difference of 
the backcast production was used. Kaufmann used the first difference 
of the backcast production as a test of the symmetry of his model, not 
as an explanatory variable. Louisiana had no system of production 
allowables similar to that of the Texas Railroad Commission. The 
exact form of the relationships is not known, so a linear model was 
used in each case, following Kaufmann. Thus for each field five 
different regression results are reported. Each regression was run 
using a two period autoregressive model. These results are presented 
in Tables 4.4(a) through 4.4(m).
Eight of the fields in this study exhibit at least one price 
parameter that is significant using a one tail t-test. One tail tests 
were utilized since there are very strong theoretical reasons for
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TABLE 4.3



























* denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Note that the dependent 




LAFITTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS









































DW 2.434 2.180 2.206 2.347 2.198
REG R2 0.021 0.013 0.042 0.014 0.003
TOTAL R2 0.967 0.967 0.955 0.954 0.953
In this and the following sub-tables, the conventions described 
below will be used.
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, 
denotes significance at the 0.05 level, 
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic after transformation.
REG R2 is the R2 for the structural part of the model (ie, excluding 
the autoregressive parameters).




BELL ISLE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.090 2.108 2.244 2.177 2.191
REG R2 0.031 0.001 0.071 0.009 0.006
TOTAL R2 0.933 0.932 0.925 0.919 0.920
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TABLE 4.4(c)
AVERY ISLAND OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 1.790 1.739 1.754 1.764 1.857
REG R2 0.203 0.010 0.095 0.010 0.057
TOTAL R2 0.908 0.885 0.843 0.824 0.838
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TABLE 4.4(d)
DEER ISLAND OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 1.992 2.020 1.938 1.911 1.934
REG R2 0.110 0.031 0.039 0.037 0.012
TOTAL R2 0.777 0.756 0.689 0.677 0.680
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TABLE 4.4(e)
BLACK BAY SE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 1.926 2.113 2.198 2.134 2.041
REG R2 0.144 0.093 0.079 0.081 0.015
TOTAL R2 0.872 0.870 0.927 0.926 0.924
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TABLE 4.4(f)
CONSTANCE BAYOU OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.444 2.363 1.962 1.671 2.056
REG R2 0.113 0.009 0.201 0.012 0.001
TOTAL R2 0.779 0.774 0.704 0.662 0.655
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TABLE 4.4(g)
BAYOU SALE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.417 2.237 2.286 2.304 2.284
REG R2 0.045 0.006 0.088 0.006 0.003
TOTAL R2 0.980 0.980 0.976 0.975 0.975
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TABLE 4.4(h)
JEANERETTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.111 1.918 2.190 1.990 2.238
REG R2 0.046 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.000
TOTAL R2 0.969 0.967 0.945 0.944 0.944
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TABLE 4.4(i)
POINTE A LA HACHE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 1.954 2.536 1.745 2.351 1.992
REG R2 0.258 0.017 0.216 0.016 0.010
TOTAL R2 0.919 0.948 0.960 0.943 0.954
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TABLE 4 .4(j)
LAKE LONG OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 1.828 1.880 2.054 1.822 2.109
REG R2 0.137 0.017 0.044 0.015 0.032
TOTAL R2 0.974 0.973 0.945 0.945 0.944
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TABLE 4.4(k)
BOUTTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.110 1.962 2.113 2.026 2.096
REG R2 0.162 0.019 0.046 0.017 0.018
TOTAL R2 0.774 0.740 0.701 0.688 0.691
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TABLE 4.4(1)
HOUMA SOUTH OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS





























DW 2.047 1.717 1.985 2.005 1.823
REG R2 0.595 0.014 0.529 0.003 0.042
TOTAL R2 0.971 0.932 0.747 0.491 0.573
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TABLE 4.4(m)
BAYOU PEROT OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS




























DW 1.892 2.396 1.833 1.921 1.766
REG R2 0.116 0.031 0.127 0.029 0.006
TOTAL R2 0.968 0.969 0.952 0.949 0.946
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believing that the price parameters are positive (ie, that production 
should increase given an increase in prices). In general, only the 
smaller fields had any significant price parameters. This may 
indicate that smaller fields (with less production) are more sensitive 
to price changes than are the more productive larger fields. Note 
that none of the parameters on the Hotelling variables (in this case 
constructed using past price changes as a proxy for expected future 
price changes) are significant using a one tail t-test.
For each significant price parameter an elasticity was 
calculated using average values for both the dependent and independent 
variables. The derivative of Rt with respect to Qt is equal to 1, so 
for the regressions in which the residual is the dependent variable 
the mean value of actual production was used in conjunction with the 
parameter estimate and the elasticity was calculated in the usual 
manner. The economic interpretation does not change in this case.
For a summary of the calculated elasticities, see Table 4.5. The 
largest elasticity is 5.81, indicating a strong relationship between 
price and production. The smallest is 0.27, which indicates that 
production is rather insensitive to changes in price. The simple mean 
of the elasticities in Table 4.5 is 1.24.
The piece-wise continuous form of Equation 4.3 was also run 
using a two period autoregressive model but the results are reported 
separately in Table 4.6. The parameter estimates are significant in 
some cases, primarily for the smaller fields in the study. This 
implies that the ability of producers to adjust output is greater in 






















HOUMA, S 105,011 1.97
(P3.5>
HOUMA, S 99 1.65
<P1.2>
HOUMA, S 91 2.47
(p3.5>
























The independent variable associated with the significant parameter 
with which the elasticity calculation has been made is given in 












































































* - Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
* - Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
*** - Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
92
more of the parameters on the natural log of the absolute value of the 
Hotelling variable are significant when the Hotelling variable is 
positive than when it is negative. For the two significant parameters 
on the independent variable when the Hotelling variable is negative, 
the sign is not the expected sign.
The change in the productive life of a field can be quantified 
using Equation 4.7. The estimated decline rates for the thirteen 
fields studied here are given in Table 4,2 (the parameter estimates on 
the TIME variable). These range from a low value of -0.072 to a high 
of -0.554, and the mean value is -0.179. The average of the real oil 
prices used in this study is $16.03 per barrel (see Table 4.1), 
although the current wellhead price is approximately $20 per barrel. 
Using the three values for the decline rate and the two values for the 
price of oil, in addition to the three values of production cost per 
barrel (see the previous Section) and the estimated cost of compliance 
with the proposed regulations of $0.70 per barrel of oil (see Farber 
and Dupont, 1992), a range of possible values can be calculated for 
the change in productive life of a field in the face of these 
regulations. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 
4.7. Note that the largest calculated loss of productive life for a 
field is 1.6 years. This occurs for the lowest decline rate, lowest 
price and largest production cost. Since Equation 4.7 is structured 
such that the percentage change in price is the driving factor (rather 
than the absolute price or absolute change in price), the $0.70 per 
barrel of oil compliance cost is calculated to have a larger impact at 
lower absolute net oil prices and lower decline rates. The production
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TABLE 4.7
LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE FIELD LIFE IN YEARS 
T' - T, see Equation 4.7
Cost - $9.76/bbl
p * - -0.072 8 - -0.179 8 - -0.554 |
$20 -0.983 -0.396 -0.128 1
$16.03 -1.644 -0.661 -0.214 |
Cost - $0.50/bbl
P 8 - -0.072 8 - -0.179 8 - -0.554
$20 -0.508 -0.204 -0.066
$16.03 -0.641 -0.258 -0.083
Cost - $0.12/bbl
P 8 - -0.072 8 - -0.179 8 - -0.554
$20 -0.498 -0.200 -0.065
$16.03 -0.625 -0.251 -0.081
T' is the life of the field after the change in net price, while 
T is the initial life of the field (both in years). The initial price 
is p (shown), while p' - p - $0.70 - Cost. See the text for further 
details.
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cost per barrel for these calculations was based on the reported costs 
(rather than the constructed cost series) and production for 1987.
The rather large upper value obtained ($9.76/bbl) was for a field with 
very little production in 1987. The loss of 1.6 years in productive 
life for such a field will have little impact on the overall 
production of oil in south Louisiana.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out using the three 
compliance cost estimates. The results are in Table 4.8. For the 
lowest price, highest production cost and highest compliance cost 
(Walk, Haydel's $1.13/barrel of oil estimate), the estimated loss of 
productive field life is 2.8 years. Again, this represents a field 
with very little production so that the actual loss of oil production 
is not likely to be significant.
The lost production calculation described in Section 4.3 was 
carried out for each field in the study for which production continued 
through 1987. If a real oil price of $16.03 per barrel (the average 
of the real oil prices for 1953 through 1987) is assumed then the mean 
of the upper bounds on lost production volume due to the regulations 
is 21,400 barrels and the median is 25,300 barrels (see Tables 4.9 and 
4.10). Of course, this production is lost at the end of the life of 
the field and for 7 of the 11 fields this is after the turn of the 
century. In no case did it appear that the productive life of a field 
would be shortened by more than one year. In total, there are 421 
fields in the coastal zone (see Table 3.2) which indicates that just 
over 9 million barrels of oil will not be produced because of the 
shortened lives of fields due to the regulations if the mean for the
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TABLE 4.8
LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE FIELD LIFE IN YEARS 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
$1.13/barrel compliance cost
p 8 « -0.072 8 - -0.179 8 - -0.554
$20 -0.83 -0.33 -0.11
$16.03 -1.05 -0.42 -0.14
$0.27/barrel compliance cost
P 8 - -0.072 8 - -0.179 8 - -0.554
$20 -0.19 -0.08 -0.03
$16.03 -0.24 -0.10 -0.03
Note: This sensitivity analysis was carried out assuming a production 
cost of $0.50/barrel. It is directly comparable to the middle table in 
Table 4.7 (p. 93).
TABLE 4.9
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SELECTED RESULTS FOR COST AND PRODUCTION FORECASTS 
LAFITTE FIELD
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POINT A LA HACHE FIELD
YEAR PRODUCTION (EST) AVERAGE COST j
2010 35,151 $14.55 |
2011 31,506 $16.60 |
2012 28,238 $18.95 |
2103 25,310 $21.62 |
2014 22,685 $24.67 |
LAKE LONG FIELD















SUMMARY RESULTS, LOST PRODUCTION ESTIMATES
SAMPLE PRICE MEAN TOTAL MEDIAN TOTAL |
FULL $16.03 21,400 9 million 25,300 10.6 mil 1
BIG $16.03 21,695 1.4 mil 21,665 1.4 mil |
LITTLE $16.03 21,063 4.1 mil 25,289 4.9 mil I
FULL $20.00 18,350 7.7 mil 20,400 8.6 mil |
BIG $20.00 18,130 1.2 mil 20,365 1.3 mil 1
LITTLE $20.00 18,615 3.6 mil 20,991 4.0 mil |
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fields in the study applies to all fields. The corresponding figure 
for the median value is 10.6 million barrels. By comparison, total 
south Louisiana oil production in 1989 was over 79 million barrels 
(DNR-OTA, Table II.1) and cumulative production between 1926 and 1989 
was 9.4 billion barrels (Lindstedt, et al., p. 58). These mean and 
median figures probably will not hold for all fields since the fields 
used in this study were all in the seven largest size classes. This 
was done precisely because the largest fields (while fewest in number) 
contain most of the oil and the smallest fields (while numerous) 
contain relatively little of the total reserves.
If a real oil price of $20 per barrel is assumed the estimated 
losses are smaller. In this case, estimated mean losses of production 
are 18,350 barrels and the median value is 20,400 barrels. This leads 
to a total estimated loss for south Louisiana of 7.7 million barrels 
using the mean value and 8.6 million barrels using the median value 
(see Table 4.10). These estimates are upper bounds as explained in 
the previous section and the actual losses quite possibly could be 
smaller.
By dividing the sample into "big" fields (from the three largest 
size classes) and "little" fields (from the next four largest size 
classes) we can perform the same calculations and compare the 
differences. Assuming a price of $16.03 per barrel, the mean lost 
production from "big" fields is 21,695 barrels while the mean from 
"little" fields is 21,063 barrels. There are 66 "big" fields in south 
Louisiana and 193 "little" fields, so that total losses from "big" 
fields are 1.4 million barrels and from "little" fields, 4.1 million
101
barrels. This translates to overall losses from the seven largest 
size classes of 5.5 million barrels, compared to an overall estimated 
loss from all fields of 9 million barrels. The lost production from 
the "big" fields will be much later in time than the lost production 
from the "little" fields. The corresponding median value results are 
21,665 barrels lost from "big" fields and 25,289 barrels lost from 
"little" fields. The little field losses are somewhat higher because 
they tend to have a higher decline rate. Estimated total losses from 
"big" fields based on the median value are 1.4 million barrels, while 
"little" field losses are estimated to be 4.9 million barrels. This 
gives a total lost production estimate from the seven largest size 
classes of 6.3 million barrels compared to total south Louisiana 
losses of 10.6 million barrels under these assumptions.
Under the $20 per barrel price assumption, mean losses of 
production are 18,130 barrels for "big" fields and 18,615 barrels for 
"little" fields. Total "big" field losses are 1.2 million barrels and 
total "little" field losses are 3.6 million barrels, which sum to 4.8 
million barrels. This compares to total south Louisiana losses for 
mean values under this scenario of 7.7 million barrels. The median 
"big" field losses are 20,365 barrels and median "little" field losses 
are 20,991 barrels. These give total estimated losses from "big" 
fields of 1.3 million barrels and from "little" fields of 4.0 million 
barrels, for a total of 5.3 million barrels. This compares to an 
estimated loss of 8.6 million barrels from all south Louisiana fields. 
See Table 4.10 for a summary of these results.
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Unfortunately, because of the imprecise nature of the method 
used to estimate lost production from premature shutdown it was not 
possible to use this method to carry out a sensitivity analysis.
Using the Walk, Haydel estimate of compliance cost resulted in no 
change in the estimated losses. The method used is simply not 
sensitive enough to detect these changes.
The HEFS calculation described in Section 4.3 was carried out 
using values for the decline rate and operating cost appreciation rate 
gained from other calculations in this study. The decline rates used 
were the average (8 - -0.179) and an arbitrarily chosen faster decline 
rate (8 » -0.25) because this calculation concerns small fields, and 
the cost appreciation rate used was the value for 8,000' wells (c - 
0.007). The rate of increase in real oil prices was arbitrarily set 
at zero; any positive value would tend to make the MEFS less sensitive 
to price changes and thus less sensitive to the regulations. T was 
arbitrarily chosen to be 20 years. The operating costs are averages 
for a 10 well field, so they were reduced by a factor of 10 since a 
very small field (the smallest field that is economically viable) will 
presumably have only one well. Results of this calculation are 
reported in Table 4.11. Using a price of $20 per barrel without 
regulations and $19.30 per barrel with regulations and 8 ~ -0.179 
leads to a change in HEFS of only 434 barrels per year or 3.63%. With 
the same decline rate and price at $16.03 per barrel with regulations 
and $15.33 per barrel without regulations, the change is 681 barrels 
per year or 4.57%. To put this in perspective, these changes amount 
to less than 1.5 barrels and 2 barrels of oil per day, respectively.
103
TABLE 4.11
MINIMUM ECONOMIC FIELD SIZE CALCULATION SUMMARY











Using the higher decline rate but the same prices, the resulting 
changes in minimum initial capacity are 545 barrels per year (3.63%) 
and 855 barrels per year (4.56%). The absolute changes are larger but 
the percentage changes are identical. On a daily basis, these changes 
are 1.5 barrels and 2.3 barrels, respectively. See Table 4.11 for a 
summary of these calculations.
A sensitivity analysis carried out on the MEFS calculation using 
a different estimated compliance cost indicates that using the Walk, 
Haydel estimate increases the MEFS by 7.6% when using the 
$16.03/barrel mean price and 6.0% when using the $20/barrel price.
This increase will not push the MEFS into the next larger size class, 
however, so the change in the loss of production due to the use of the 
higher compliance cost estimate will not be dramatic. See Table 4.12 
for a summary of this sensitivity analysis.
The compliance costs used in this study are average costs that 
abstract away from considerations of fixed costs versus variable 
costs. If the fixed costs are high enough to offset the quasi-rents 
the producer will shut down even if the increase in the marginal cost 
due to the regulations is quite low. Because this model does not 
consider this aspect of compliance costs the results will not capture 
these effects if they are present. This question of fixed and 
variable cost magnitudes has implications for producer decision 
making. If, as the Walk, Haydel study assumes, producers will provide 
their own capital equipment for injection of produced water, the fixed 
costs would be very large and any fixed cost effect would be 
important. The Kerr and Associates study implicitly assumes that
TABLE 4.12
MINIMUM ECONOMIC FIELD SIZE CALCULATION SUMMARY 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS










Note: This sensitivity analysis was performed assuming that the Walk, 
Haydel estimated compliance cost ($1.13/barrel of oil) is the true 
compliance cost.
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producers will use commercial disposal facilities and that the cost 
will be preponderantly variable with very low fixed costs. In that 
case, the fixed cost effect would be insignificant.
6 . Summary and Conclusions
Two approaches to modeling oil production have been examined.
The traditional econometric technique downplays the geophysical 
aspects of oil production and emphasizes the response of firms to 
changes in economic variables (primarily price). The engineering 
approach takes the opposite tack, in most cases ignoring economic 
variables altogether. An attempt has been made in this chapter to 
synthesize the two views.
The results of the empirical work suggest that economic 
variables, while playing a significant role in decisions about whether 
or not a field should be developed and when a field should be shut 
down, for the most part have little effect on decisions about how much 
oil will be produced each period from a producing field. The weak 
significance of the estimated parameters on economic variables for the 
large fields in the regression results reported in Tables 4.4(a) 
through 4.4(m) lead to the conclusion that net price does not 
significantly influence production levels. This is consistent with 
the work of Camm, et al. and Deacon, et al. However, the results of 
Table 4.4 indicates that price does have some influence on output 
decisions in smaller fields. Additionally, the piece-wise regressions 
using the Hotell variables indicate that for some fields this 
relationship is significant. These results are mixed.
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The elasticity calculations in Table 4.5 are also mixed. Nine 
of the relationships are indicated to be inelastic while only four are 
indicated to be elastic. However, one of the relationships is found 
to be extremely elastic.
Net price does play a role in the shut down decision and it does 
influence minimum economic field size. However, Table 4.7 indicates 
that the shut down time will be brought forward only marginally, by as 
much as 19 months or less (out of a total productive life that can run 
from 20 to 30 years), if the net price of oil received by producers 
falls by $0.70 per barrel due to regulations. The lost production 
volumes are estimated to be 10.6 million barrels in a worst case 
scenario. These results suggest that small price changes and the 
imposition of the proposed regulations will have very little effect on 
the production of oil from existing wells in coastal south Louisiana.
Net price also plays a role in the determination of whether or 
not a field of a given size will be developed. The results in Table 
4.11 show that the produced waters regulations will have an effect on 
the minimum economic field size of as little as 2.5 barrels per day 
initial production.
CHAPTER 5
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has analyzed and quantified the economic 
effects of proposed produced waters discharge regulations. Produced 
waters are those fluids brought to the surface when oil is produced, 
and have been shown to harm marine life when disposed into inland 
waters and swamps. This study has not attempted to estimate either 
the economic value of the harm done by surface disposal of untreated 
produced waters or the economic benefits of oil and gas activity. 
Proposed regulations would require producers of oil to either treat 
the produced waters before surface disposal or to inject the untreated 
produced waters into underground formations. Complying with the 
regulations will increase the costs of production. The present 
analysis has been carried out by modelling the oil industry in coastal 
south Louisiana and incorporating the cost of compliance with the 
regulations into the model.
The oil industry participates in two broad phases of activities. 
Exploration is the process of looking for deposits of oil, primarily 
by drilling exploratory wells (including wildcat wells). Once a 
deposit of oil has been found that can profitably be developed and 
produced, production begins. These are very broad categorizations but 
they capture the most important aspects of oil industry activity. 
Correspondingly, this study has been divided into two analyses: a 
study of the exploration activity of firms, and a study of the 
production of oil from existing fields. This dissertation also
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estimates how the regulations will affect the decision whether or not 
to develop a field and the related decision of when to shut down a 
producing field.
The exploration analysis was further broken down into two 
related objectives. The first objective was to estimate how various 
explanatory variables impact the number of wildcat wells drilled in a 
year. Two different models were used, both based on an objective 
function which firms engaged in oil exploration are assumed to 
maximize. The second objective was to estimate the number and size of 
remaining undiscovered oil fields in the study area. This was modeled 
by making the widely accepted assumption that fields are distributed 
log normally by size in a geologically homogeneous region. By 
dividing known fields into size classes, one can draw conclusions 
about the remaining fields in the region which are undiscovered.
The two models for the objectives in the exploratory drilling 
section can be used together recursively. In this way, it is possible 
to use as explanatory variables in the wildcat drilling model the 
wellhead price of oil and gas, the expected success rate for drilling 
based on the estimate of the number of remaining undiscovered fields 
and an estimate of finding rates relative to the cumulative number of 
wildcat wells, and the size of the fields expected to be found (also 
based on the model for the second objective). This recursive 
procedure allows both economic theory and variables and geological 
factors to be analyzed simultaneously, and a much richer model of 
exploratory activity is obtained.
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The empirical estimates of the parameters on the explanatory 
variables in the exploratory model indicate that the impact of the 
regulations will be slight. However, the presence of 
multicollinearity requires that this conclusion be advanced 
cautiously. More definitive statements about the regulatory impact 
cannot be made until such time as more and better data is available.
The estimated net price elasticity of wildcat drilling is 0.279 using 
the mean values of the price and wildcat drilling variables over all 
years in the sample.
The estimated parameters were used to forecast future wildcat 
drilling activity. These forecasts show that wildcat drilling 
activity will continue to decline in coastal south Louisiana under 
current economic and technological conditions even in the absence of 
new regulations. This is primarily due to the fact that coastal south 
Louisiana is a very mature area, has been thoroughly explored, and 
only the most expensive oil remains in place. The imposition of 
costly regulations will reinforce this trend, but the effects may be 
small and more in the nature of delays in the timing of exploratory 
drilling and discovery of new fields. Again, the presence of 
multicollinearity requires caution in interpreting and using these 
results.
The section of this study devoted to production was similarly 
divided into two objectives. The first objective was to estimate the 
relationship between price and production so that a supply elasticity 
could be calculated. This was approached by way of two different but 
parallel models. The first model is an attempt to combine economic
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and geological factors in the analysis by estimating a "natural" 
decline rate and then using economic variables to explain deviations 
in actual production from the production expected based on the 
"natural" decline rate. This approach implies that oil producing 
firms have limited control over the production from their fields and 
thus are limited in how they can respond to changes in the net price 
of oil. The other approach is to say simply that firms directly vary 
the amount of oil produced in response to changes in net price.
Empirical results reported in Chapter 4 suggest that oil 
production is rather insensitive to net price. The estimated price 
parameters are significant in relatively few cases. Generally, they 
are significant for regressions involving smaller fields but 
insignificant for those involving larger fields. In addition, there 
are more significant parameters when the residual is the dependent 
variable than when actual production is the dependent variable. This 
lends support to the view that producers are constrained in their 
responses to changes in price insofar as altering production is 
concerned, particularly in large fields. Estimated price elasticities 
of oil production range from a high of 5.81 to a low of 0.27. The 
simple mean of the elasticities is 1.24. None of the parameters on 
the simple Hotelling variable were significant, but a piece-wise 
regression using the Hotelling variable indicates that producers may 
respond asymmetrically to changes in the Hotelling variable, primarily 
in smaller fields. In the absence of a good model of producer price 
expectations, however, this is not a true test of Hotelling's theory.
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The second part of the production study attempts to estimate 
lost production volumes caused by early shut down of existing wells, 
and to quantify the effects of the regulations on the minimum economic 
field size. Using a model developed by Camm, et.al., an estimate was 
made of lost production given the reduction in net price caused by 
costly regulations. The worst case scenario estimate was that 1.6 
years of production would be lost. This 1.6 years is at the end of 
the productive life of the field when produced oil volumes are very 
low. Forecasts of production using the decline rates and of costs 
using the estimated cost function were made to determine how average 
marginal cost would behave over time and at what point this cost would 
become greater than price. This procedure led to estimated losses 
between 10.6 million barrels of oil and 4.8 million barrels of oil, 
depending upon the assumptions made. The corresponding dollar values 
are $170 million and $96 million (these are future values). These
losses will occur at the end of the life of the fields, in most cases
estimated to be after the turn of the century. This estimate is based 
on econometric results that are counter-intuitive and should be used 
and interpreted cautiously.
Minimum economic field size was estimated using a net present 
value function, setting it equal to zero and solving for initial 
production. By comparing the initial production calculated at some 
benchmark price with the initial production calculated at the
benchmark price less the cost of compliance, the impact of the
regulations can be quantified. The impact of the regulations on MEFS 
is estimated to be quite small. The cost of compliance with the
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regulations will increase MEFS by less than 5%, or 855 barrels of oil 
in the first year of production in a worst case scenario. That is 
roughly 2.4 barrels of oil per day over and above what would be needed 
in the absence of the regulations to make a field commercially viable. 
The initial production level required in this worst case scenario with 
the regulations in place is 19,587 barrels per year (first year). 
According to knowledgeable petroleum engineers that is a plausible but 
by no means exceptional initial production for a well in south 
Louisiana.
The most important aspect of this dissertation which needs 
further work is that of producer price expectations (see also Walls, 
1992). It is crucial to an understanding of the oil and gas industry 
that a good model of how producers' price expectations are formed is 
available. This is not a simple task but it is a most important one 
because of the dynamic nature of this non-renewable resource 
extraction problem.
It will also be helpful to incorporate a more realistic and 
sophisticated model of the tax regime under which producers in coastal 
south Louisiana operate. This would allow comparisons between various 
fiscal systems' effects on the petroleum industry. In the current 
atmosphere of fiscal uncertainty in Louisiana this aspect of the model 
could become very attractive.
An interest in the economics of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
activity has been expressed by outside parties. Analysis of EOR 
economics appears to be a rather straightforward adaptation of the 
present model. If domestic oil and gas fields continue to decline and
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the United States becomes more dependent upon foreign oil, EOR will 
become the focus of a great deal of attention. An estimate of the 
conditions under which EOR activity is profitable and how 
environmental regulations will affect EOR activity will be very 
important for policy makers.
An area for research which is not strictly a part of this effort
but which is an adjunct to it is that of the demand side. A model of
the demand for domestic petroleum would coincide with the current work
and provide an estimate of the price of oil endogenous to the model,
given some level of production in the rest of the world. This effort 
would not only make the model richer but would make it possible to 
estimate the effects of increasing corporate average fuel economy 
(CAFE) standards or other demand side factors on the petroleum 
industry in south Louisiana.
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